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ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL
CIVIL LITIGATION: IS RULE 34 UP
TO THE TASK?
HON. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN *
JEFFREY RABKIN
Abstract: in today's world an increasing proportion of the information
subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is stored elec-
tronically, rather than on traditional media. Despite this development, there
has been no widespread debate as to whether the federal discovery rules ade-
quately address the difficult  issues that frequently arise during discovery of
electronically-stored information. Rather, practitioners and judges have as-
sumed that the same rules applicable to the discovety of traditional forms of
evidence are' easily applied to electronic data. Our overarching concern is
the continuing validity of that assumption. This Article focuses specifically
on how discovery of electronic evidence proceeds under Rule 34. We con-
clude that Rule 34 has shortcomings in this context, and therefore propose
two simple but potentially significant changes in the wording of the Rule it-
self The Article ends by noting that the legal community must confront sev-
eral additional complex issues arising from the need to adapt the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to the new era . of electronic information.
INTRODUCTION
At the close of this millennium, at least this much is clear about
the next: Computers will play an increasingly pervasive role in Ameri-
can society. Although the first computer capable of using stored pro-
grams was developed little over fifty years ago, its progeny are already
ubiquitous in the corporate world, and the number of households
that own personal computers continues to rise) As a federal district
* United States District judge, Southern District of New York.
** Law Clerk, Judge Shim A. Scheindlin (1996-1997); Associate, Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher (1997-1999); Deputy City Attorney, Office of the City Attorney of San Francisco
(2000—present).
I See Diamond v. Diehl., 450 U.S. 175, 194 11.1 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describ-
ing first general purpose computer). One survey by a leading market research firm esti-
mates that more than half of all American homes now have computers, as compared with
40% two years ago. See Mike Tonsing, Electronic Mail Is Ubiquitous And Its Consequences Are
Enormous, FED. LAW., May 1999, at 56.
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court judge wrote over ten years ago, "From the largest corporations
to the smallest families, people are using computers to cut costs, im-
prove production, enhance communication, store countless data and
improve capabilities in every aspect of human and technological de-
velopinent."2 Within the last five years, the combination of e-mail and
widespread access to the Internet has resulted in the proliferation of
electronic communication on an unanticipated scale. 3
The mushrooming of computers in contemporary life has revolu-
tionized the way we store information and communicate. Increasingly,
electronic storage devices have replaced paper document deposito-
ries.4 E-mail and the Internet have begun to replace the telephone as
the way people conduct daily personal and business communications .3
Also, computers are involved in an increasing number of commercial
transactions. According to one report, consumer purchases made
over the Internet will rise from $289 million in 1996 to $26 billion in
2001.6 These technological developments have, in turn, had an im-
portant effect on civil litigation.? •
2 Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (Greene, J.).
3
 One writer noted that there were an estimated 50 million users of the Internet in
1996 and that the number of users is projected to rise to 200 million by the end of 1999.
See Jack E. Brown, Obscenity, Anonymity and Database Protection: Emerging Internet Issues, COM-
PUTER Law., Oct. 1997, at 1. Others predict the number of Internet users will rise to 320
million by 2002. See DANIEL H. RIMER, HAMBRECHT & QUIST, CRITICAL PATH: CAPITALIZ-
ING ON THE NEW E-MAIL PARADIGM 3 (1999). Mr. Rimer also states that the number of e-
mail mailboxes currently outnumbers users by a ratio of more than two to one and will
continue to outnumber Internet users in the future. See id.; see also Donald J. Karl, State
Regulation of Anonymous Internet Use After ACLU of Georgia v. Miller, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513,
513-14 (1998) (describing the growth of Internet use).
4 1n May 1997, one commentator estimated that 30% of the information that goes into
business computers never appears in paper form. See Susan J. Silvernail, Electronic Evidence:
Discovery in the Computer Age, ALA. LAW., May 1997, at 177; see also Paul Frisman, E-mail: Dial
For 'Evidence,' N.J. L. J., Dec. 25, 1995, at 12.
3 Ms. Silvernail has estimated that 40 million e-mail users will send 60 billion messages
by 2000. See Silvernail, supra note 4, at 181. Time magazine estimated that 2.6 trillion e-
ntailed messages passed through U.S.-based computer networks in 1997 and that the num-
ber would increase to 6.6 trillion by 2000. See S.C. Gwynne & John F. Dickerson, Lost In The
E-mail, TIME, Apr. 21, 1997, at 88.
6 See John Rothchild, Protecting The Digital Consumer: The Limits Of Cyberspace Utopianism,
74 IND. L.J. 893, 895 (citing BILL. BURNHAM, THE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE REPORT 238
(1997) and DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY 38 (1998)).
The New York Times reports Internet consumer sales are predicted to jump from $3.9
billion in 1998 to $108 billion in 2003. See Leslie Kaufman, Amazon.com Plans A Thansforma-
don To Internet Bazaar, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at Al.
7 The proliferation of computer technology has also raised difficult issues in the con-
text of criminal law. See, e.g., United States V. Reyes, .922 F. Supp. 818, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(defendant moved to suppress telephone numbers obtained by government agents from
the electronic data storage unit on his paging device); United States v. Paredes, 950 F.
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For example, while lawyers may be traditionally slow to adopt
technology for their own use, some recognized over a decade ago that
discovery should include demands for the production of electronic
evidence.8 And, as society moves decisively in the direction of elec-
tronic communication and data storage, lawyers suspect they will find
the "smoking guns" in an electronic format rather than in a paper
form. Recent experience demonstrates the accuracy of this assump-
tion. For example, Kenneth Starr's team found the infamous "talking
points" document that forced Monica Lewinsky to accept an immu-
nity deal in a computer file Lewinsky thought she had deleted from
her computet9 One need not look far to find e-mail messages that
have played crucial roles in the outcome of recent litigation. For ex-
ample, one scholar reports the settlement of a sexual harassment case
after the plaintiff discovered an e-mail from the company president to
the head of personnel stating (with regard to the plaintiff): "Get rid
of that tight-assed bitch."1° Another example of e-mail from top-level
executives that played an important role in litigation is found in the
recent Microsoft anti-trust trial." Exhibits in this case included bicker-
ing e-mail correspondence between Bill Gates and Andy Grove, Chief
Executive Officers of Microsoft and Intel, respectively. 12
Stipp. 584, 586, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing murder-for-hire indictment where sole
basis for. jurisdiction was intrastate use of tristate paging system); People v. Jovanovic, 700
N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (App. Div. 1999) (reversing conviction for kidnapping, sexual abuse and
assault and ordering a new trial where trial court improperly excluded e-mailed messages
from complainant to defendant indicating interest in sadomasochism).
8 "Computers have become so commonplace that most court battles now involve dis-
covery of some type of computer-stored information." Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 462.
9 See J. Gregory Whitehair & Kimberly Koontz, Discoverability Of Electronic Data, COLO.
LAW., Oct. 1998, at 45; see also infra Part 1.C.1 (discussing recoverable deleted files).
18 See Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-mail, OR. ST. B. Bum., Dec.
1995, at 21.
u see
12 See, e.g., James V. Grimaldi, Microsoft Thal—Gates' Spat With Intel Is Revealed By E-mail,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 23, 1999, at El. Other cases also have involved incriminating e-mail.
See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 1997) (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring in part) (noting, in an ERISA decision, that freelancers are treated differently
from employees because, among other things, freelancers had different e-mail addresses);
Meloff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372, 373. 376 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying summary
judgment in libel suit based in part on e-mail evidence); Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
No. 96 Civ. 9747, 1997 WL 793004 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24. 1997) (involving suit by two African-
American employees against a large investment banking firm that allegedly circulated
racist e-mail message among white employees); Angleton v. Beech Aircraft Corp., No. 96—
1027-1FM. 1997 WL 446262, at *2 (D. Ran. July 30, 1997) (involving e-mail sent by plaintiff
to supervisor).
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The efforts of federal litigants to discover their opponents' e-mail
and other forms of electronic evidence raise a fundamental threshold
issue: To what extent—if at all—do the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure" permit such discovery? A broad majority of practitioners,
judges and academics believe It is black letter law that computerized
data is discoverable if relevant"" and assume that the Rules permit
the discovery of e-mail and other electronically-stored information.
Yet the Rules provide no guidance regarding the discovery of e-mail
and make almost no reference to electronic evidence. As one practi-
tioner has observed:
The rules of civil procedure were written at a time when in-
formation was stored primarily on paper, in the form of
documents; and the discovery rules are thus designed to
deal with information stored on paper .... The current
rules do not deal adequately with information stored in elec-
tronic form .... Astoundingly, [Rule 26(b) (1)] does not
even mention information stored in electronic form. Simi-
larly, Rule 30(b) (5) provides a means to compel a deponent
to bring with him or her "documents or other tangible
things," but makes no provision for data stored in electronic
form. Rule 34 makes an extremely awkward attempt to reach
electronic information in its definition of documents; but
the language is so awkward and convoluted as to be almost
completely opaque."
Despite observations of this kind, there is no basis to conclude
that the current state of technology has so outpaced the federal dis-
covery rules as to render them unworkable or obsolete. But as e-mail,
program files, Web sites, cookies, caches 16 and their ilk replace paper
documents as the primary means of data collection, storage and
17 We refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the "Rules."
14
 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995); see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos.
94 C 897 MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *I (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995); Bills, 108 F.R.D. at
461. Commentators frequently quote Hasbro with approval. Ste, e.g.. Joseph P. Zammit &
Lynette A. Herscha, Litigation Issues In A Cyber World, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 18TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTION ON COMPUTER LAW 122 (1998). These cases specifically dealt with
program files or e-mail, and not the newer forms of electronic evidence such as cookies,
temporary files, residual data or Web caches.
15
 Hearings Before the Advisory Committe on Rules of Civil Procedure, (Baltimore, MD) (Dec.
7, 1998) (testimony of Allen D. Black).
16 See infra Part I.C.2. (describing these common types of electronic evidence).
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transmission, the need for a comprehensive overhaul of the federal
discovery rules to adapt them to our digitalized society must be de-
bated seriously. Of particular concern is Rule 34, which provides for
the discovery of documentary evidence. 17 After all, how well can we
expect a discovery rule priniarily designed to deal with paper docu-
ments to function in an increasingly paperless world?
This Article analyzes the adequacy of Rule 34 with respect to the
discovery of electronically-stored hiformation. 19 It also aspires to high-
light the intrinsic differences between paper-based and electronically-
stored information, and to show how these differences raise new dis-
covery issues not addressed by Rule 34. Part I provides an explanation
in lay terms of how computers process and store information elec-
tronically, as well as an overview of the' types of electronically-stored
information that, while subject to discovery, are often invisible (and
thus unknown) to lawyers and computer users alike. Part II describes
briefly the current framework of document discovery under Rule 34.
Part III explains how electronic document discovery under Rule 34
poses challenges that are not analogous to "paper" discovery disputes
and evaluates whether the current version of Rule 34 provides ade-
quate guidance to resolve these issues. Part IV proposes two simple
but potentially far-reaching amendments to Rule 34 in an effort to
adapt the Rule to electronic discovery. Finally, Part V flags key issues
regarding electronic discovery that the legal community should ad-
dress in the near future. 19
I. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY TERMS DEFINED AND EXPLAINED
Let us begin with an uncontroversial observation: Electronic de-
vices have begun to replace paper as the primary means of storing
17 See infra Part II.B. (describing Rule 34 in greater detail).
is focusing on Rule 34, this Article does not mean to imply that the other Rules are
of no concern. To the contrary, the same definitional and logistical problems discussed
below regarding Rule 34 present themselves under Rule 30(b) (5), which governs docu-
ment productions at party depositions, and Rule 45, which permits parties to require non-
parties to produce "designated books, documents or tangible things in the possession,
custody or control" of those non-parties. See FED. R. ay. P. 30(b) (5), 45(a) (1).
IS For more future-looking and radical proposals for altering the Rules to incorporate
modern technology for purposes of conducting more efficient trials, see generally Paul D.
Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit To John Bunyan's Celestial City. 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1516, 1524-34 (1998) (proposing. among other things, virtual trials and virtual appellate
review). Although Professor Carrington's work does not touch in any detail on discovery of
electronic data, it does provide a vision of how a more technology-oriented . civil justice
system might operate.
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information, just as the Internet has begun to replace the postal sys-
tem as the primary means of transmitting information. Where once
people typed memoranda on paper and sent them by mail, now they
generate word processor files on their computers and send them by e-
mail. In a world where paper increasingly takes a back seat to elec-
tronic media, prosaic terms such as "document," "possession" and
even "evidence" take on an ambiguity in the context of discovery.
What types of computerized information are "documents" as the term
is used by Rule 34? Does a litigant "possess" computer files after she
discards them? This Article attempts to address these questions in
Parts IV and V. To begin, however, we must define the universe of evi-
dence with which we are concerned, and the natural starting place is
the recently-coined term "electronic evidence."
A. Basic Definitions
Electronic evidence has been defined as "information stored in
electronic form that . is relevant to the issues in a particular litiga-
tion."20
 In the context of federal civil litigation, this definition is un-
der-inclusive for two reasons. First, in some circumstances, discovery is
permissible before litigation has commenced or even after an action
has concluded in a judgment.21
 Second, the Rules currently allow dis-
covery of information both if it is relevant to the subject matter of a
lawsuit or if it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence.22
 It is therefore more appropriate to define elec-
" MICHAEL R. OVERLY, OVERLY ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CALIFORNIA § 1.01, at
1-2 (1999).
21
 Rule 27(a) (3) offers a method of obtaining inspection of documents and things for
use in a future action. See FED. R. Civ. P. R. 27(a) (3). The rule was intended "to apply to
situations where, for one reason or another, testimony might be lost to a prospective liti-
gant unless take[n] immediately, without waiting until after a suit or other legal proceed-
ing is commenced." In re Ferkauf, 3 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Similarly, Rule 27(b)
provides a procedure for perpetuating testimony while a case is on appeal, for use in the
event of further proceedings in the district court. See Fen. R. Civ. P. 27(b); see generally 8
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE. AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2n §§ 2071-76
(1994) (discussing Rule 27 in detail).
n See FED. R. Cm P. 26(b) (1). The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has published
an amendment that will alter the wording of Rule 26(b) (1) from "relevant to the subject
matter of a lawsuit" to any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense
of any party" but will allow discovery of matters falling within the former category for good
cause shown. If approved by the Supreme Court and not rejected by Congress, these pro-
posed changes will take effect at the end of 2000.
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tronic evidence as any electronically-stored information subject to
pretrial discovery."
In addition, throughout this Article we use the term "electronic
document" to refer to a subset of electronic evidence: information
intentionally created by a computer user 24 and stored in electronic
form. The term electronic document comes about naturally because
the word "document" has been defined broadly in other legal con-
texts as "any physical embodiment of information or ideas." 25 By using
the modifier "electronic," the term incorporates the idea that the
"physical embodiment of information or ideas" must be kept in elec-
tronic form—or, as will be explained below, in the form of binary
numbers stored on electric transistors.
B. How Computers Transform and Store Information in Binary Form
In order to evaluate the potential difficulties arising from discov-
ery of electronic evidence under Rule 34, one must first have a basic
understanding of how computers transform information into an elec-
tronic form and how that information is then stored. To this end, this
Part briefly explains how all computers convert the myriad forms of
information they process into binary numerals. This Part also de-
scribes how computers use and record those binary numerals on stor-
age devices and the most common sources of electronic evidence.
We begin with the observation that almost all electronic informa-
tion is stored in the form of binary numerals. 26 Text, sound and pic-
tures (or "graphics") are all reduced to a series of zeros and ones in-
side the computer. This is true of all computers, regardless of their
size, purpose or design. Therefore, in a fundamental sense, comput-
ers are nothing more than a collection of organized switches operat-
23 "Electronically-stored" includes all information stored digitally, optically . or in ana-
logue form.
24 As explained below in Part I.C.1.. a computer creates a broad range of electroni-
cally-stored information without a user's knowledge. We intend the term "electronic
document" to exclude such information.
25 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 481 (Gth ed. 1990) (citing Strico v. Lotto, 324 N.Y.S.2d
483. 486 (1971)). This definition would include pictures or tapes. We note, however, that
at least one lay dictionary defines the term "document" to mean simply "a writing convey-
ing meaning." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE. DICTIONARY 342 (10th ed. 1993).
26 Some data is stored in analogue form, using continuous variable attributes such as
voltages or pressure, instead of binary numbers. This type of storage is not discussed in
detail in this Article.
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ing at incredibly high speeds. 21 These switches have only two settings,
on and off. All computer operations are the result of the manipula-
tion of huge numbers of these switches. Microscopic electronic de-
vices called "transistors" are used to perform the computer's switching
functions. Today, approximately sixteen-million transistors can be put
onto a chip the size of a thumbnail, and microchip designers are con-
stantly finding new ways of adding more transistors to memory chips.
Moreover, computers may soon use transistors built on a molecular
scale, radically increasing the number of switches that can fit on to a
single chip.28
Because they only have two settings, transistors can only hold two
types of information. Computer designers refer to this as binary in-
formation and assign the values "0" and "1" to the transistor's two pos-
sible states. Each "0" or "1" is referred to as a "bit" of information. By
combining transistors, computers can process and store any decimal
number by using binary notation. Additionally, the letters of the al-
phabet, as well as commonly-used symbols (such as “Sc,” "§” or
"1") can be processed and stored by assigning a number to each letter
and symbol. 29 For example:
Letter	 Decimal (Base 10)	 Binary (Base 2)
Number	 Number
A	 0	 0
B 1	 1
C	 2	 10
D 3	 11
E 4	 100
F	 5	 101
The chart above also illustrates a concept that becomes important in
the context of electronic discovery. A series of zeros and ones stored
on a computer's hard drive is meaningless without a key to translate
27 See Roll WHITE, How COMPUTERS WORK 36 (1997) ("[A] computer is just a collec-
tion of On/Off switches.").
2 See DNA Computing, PC MAG., Nov. 2, 1999, at 11; Madeleine Acey, Chemist Drives Gas
Powered Computers, CMP TEcHIAls, Oct. 14, 1999, Chttp.//www.techweb.com/wire/story/
TWB19991014S0001>.
29 The chart beloW is simply an example of assigning numbers to letters. In fact, most
computers use a standardized code called the American Standard Code for Information
Interchange ("ASCII") to assign numbers to represent the alphabet, digits 0 through 9,
punctuation marks and other commonly-used typographical symbols.
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those bits into information. The chart above, for example, indicates
that "101" signifies the letter F. Without the chart, however, the in-
formation cannot be deciphered.
Bits are the fundamental building blocks of electronically-stored
information. In computer .terminology, eight bits comprise one "byte"
of storage capacity or "memory."" Computer storage capacity is usu-
ally measured in thousands (or millions) of bytes of information. 31
Although it might appear cumbersome to translate letters and deci-
mals into zeros and ones, computers do it at lightning speed and can
store an enormous volume of bits. For example, the floppy disks
commonly used a decade ago were capable of storing enough zeros
and ones to record up to 180 pages of text. Today's CD-ROM disks
can store approximately 325,000 pages of text. The average PC hard
disk can store up to two million pages of text. 32 The sheer volume of
discoverable electronic evidence—and the trend towards ever greater
computer storage capacity—poses logistical challenges to lawyers, liti-
gants and the courts."
C. Types of Electronic Evidence Subject to Discovery
Most computer users are aware that word processors, spread-
sheets, e-mail programs and other popularly-used "accessories" gener-
ate information that is stored electronically in the form of "files." It is
also commonly understood that pictures and sound can he stored and
transmitted electronically. Computers, however, generate far more
information than most users realize. For example, most word proces-
sor programs automatically store prior drafts of written documents, as
well as the time and dates of past edits and the name of the person
who made those edits. Another interesting and unexpected example
is the category of deleted, but recoverable, program files. Because
these types of "hidden" or unknown computer data comprise a large
proportion of the total universe of discoverable electronic evidence,
" Bytes (or groups of eight bits) are themselves made up of two units of four bits
called nibbles. By using binary numerals, each nibble can store up to 16 different ar-
rangements of bits—and thus can represent decimal numbers 1 through 16. A byte, there-
fore, can represent up to 256 different numbers. See RICHARD %mum BITING DEEPER
hero Tnz APPLE'S CORE 44, 46 (1985).
m Metric prefixes are often used in this context. Thus, "64r may be used to refer to 64
"kilobytes," or 64,000 bits of information.
as See OVERLY, supra note 20, § 1.01, at 1-3.
33 See infra Part 111.C.6.
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they are addressed. Part III notes, that this category of data creates
special problems in the context of discovery.
]. Types of Stored Data
Computer storage devices come in a variety of shapes and sizes.
Most desktop personal computers ("PCs") store data on removable
diskettes, internal or external hard drives and/or CD-ROM devices.
Laptops and handheld computers54 also store information in memory
cards powered by miniature batteries. 35 Networked computers, such as
those used by most large businesses, both store data on large hard
drives and copy the information stored on their system to a backup
system (typically using magnetic tapes to store the data) on a regular
basis to guard against accidental loss of data. Individual users and
small businesses can back up their computer storage devices by send-
ing their files over the Internet to a third party's computer. This
means, for example, that a back-up copy of information stored on a
computer in San Francisco may exist in Internet storage devices lo-
cated in Tokyo and New York. In fact, several companies offer coin-
puter users free storage space on their Web sites. 36
The information generated and stored by programs such as word
processors and spread sheets (or any other software running on a
computer) are typically stored in data files, also known as "program
files" because they are generated by specific computer programs. For
example, a computer user who generates a  document on a word
processor and then saves it to disk (either the hard drive on the com-
puter or a removable diskette) has created a data file that contains the
document created by the user. Therefore, data files can be stored lo-
cally on the computer or remotely, either on a portable diskette or a
storage device at another site.
Many people incorrectly believe that once they have deleted a
data file it cannot be recovered. Many programs, however, have an
34 Examples of a personal electronic organizer are the popular Palm Pilot and Nino
and their recent rival, the Visor; all are typically used to store information such as tele-
phone numbers, calendar and scheduling information and travel expenses. The newer
versions of the palm-sized computers are capable of running word processing programs,
spreadsheets and Web browsers.
35 Microchips, or Integrated circuits," and the information they store increasingly are
integrated into everyday technology. For example, automobile air bag systems designed to
inflate only in specific circumstances may record not only the time of an accident, but also
the speed at which the car was traveling and the angle of impact.
36 For example, the following Web sites allow users to store personal information:
wwwi-drive.com ; www.idrop.coni; www.docspace.com ; and www.filemonkey.com .
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automatic backup feature that creates and periodically saves copies of
a file as the user works on it. Such files, referred to by some as "repli-
cant data," "temporary files" or "file clones," are intended to help us-
ers recover data losses caused by computer malfunction." For exam-
' ple, if a user accidentally turns off her computer without saving a
word processing file, she may be able to recover that file because the
computer has saved a recent version of it in a "temporary file." Simi-
larly, networks copy information to removable or offsite storage de-
vices on a regular basis. These backup devices may contain copies of
deleted program files.
Recovery is possible even in the case of a deleted program file for
which no clone or backup version was created. To explain why this is
so requires a short description of the way computer storage devices
function. Typically, when computers "write" data onto a storage device
(such as a hard disk), they first check the storage device's "directory"
to locate unused bits of storage onto which the data may be written.
After locating free "memory" sufficient to record the data, the com-
puter then (1) writes the data onto the free bits of disk space, and
(2) edits the directory to make sure that area of storage is marked "in
use"—the computer will not use that space to store other data in the
future.
"Deleting" a file does not actually erase that data from the com-
puter's storage devices. Rather, it simply finds the data's entry in the
disk directory and changes it to a "not used" status—thus permitting
the computer to write over the "deleted" data. Until the computer
writes over the "deleted" data, however, it may be recovered by search-
ing the disk itself rather than the disk's directory." Accordingly, many
files are recoverable long after they have been deleted—even if nei-
ther the computer user nor the computer itself is aware of their exis-
tence. Such data is referred to as "residual data.""
There is another form of hidden electronic evidence that must
be mentioned. As noted earlier, a program file may automatically cre-
ate and store more information than that entered by the computer
user. For example, word processor programs typically store inform-
don about when data files are created, who edits them and when, and
37 See Joan E. Feldman & Rodger I. Kolui, The Essentials Of Computer Discovery, in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 51,54 (1999).
38
 An analogy would be removing someone's house address from the phone book. The
house still may be located if you know what it looks like, even if you do not know exactly
where to look.
59 See Feldman & Kohn, supra note 37, at 55.
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who accesses them. We refer to such automatically-created informa-
tion as "embedded" data because it is not normally visible when the
document is printed.
Additionally, many networked computer systems require users to
"log on" to the system by typing in a password. The computer then
typically records which users signed onto the system and when and
where they did so, all of which may be relevant in a lawsuit and there-
fore discoverable. Along the same lines, networked computers are
sometimes set up so as to grant certain employees greater access to
certain parts of the system. For example, a system might permit the
author of a document to limit the number and/or identity of indi-
viduals who can edit and view that document to specified individuals.
Critical research information might be available only to a small hand-
ful of system users. As with the log information, the access control list
may be relevant and discoverable information.
Furthermore, some employers set up their computer systems to
monitor their employees automatically. Such systems will track and
store information such as when users access specific programs, how
long they use them and whether users have edited specific docu-
ments. Also, employers can keep track of which Web sites employees
access and what files they download from those Web sites.
2. Types Of Internet-Rdated Computer Information
E-mail is fast becoming the primary means of communication
between businesses and individuals. Estimates of e-mail volume range
as high as one million messages every hour. 4° With the rise of its use
in the office, and because of the common tendency to say things in e-
mail messages that otherwise would not be reduced to written form,u
4° See OVERLY, supra note 20, § 2.12, at 2-18; see also supra note 5.
it Several commentators have observed that many people express thoughts and make
statements using e-mail that they would not otherwise put down in writing. See, e.g., United
States v. Maxwell, 45 MI 406, 410, 412 (CA.A.F. 1996) (involving Air Force Colonel ac-
cused of transmitting child pornography through graphic files attached to e-mailed mes-
sages); Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 Civ. 9747, 1997 WL 793004 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(involving suit by two African-American employees against large investment banking firm
that allegedly circulated racist e-mail messages among white employees); Miller v. U.S.F.&
G., No. 93-1968, 1994 WL 395718, at *2, 5 (D. Md. 1994) (involving suit against corpora-
tion by Human Resources Manager, claiming discrimination in discharge for participation
with male co-workers in using numeric code system in e-mailed messages to refer to pro-
fanity); United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Stipp. 1177, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (involv-
ing participant in America Online chat-room accused of sending e-mail messages contain-
ing graphic files of child pornography). Mr. Overly attributes this phenomenon to the ease
•and speed with which e-mail can be generated and sent, lending to "heat of the moment"
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e-mail has proven to be the source of the "smoking kun" in high
profile cases and, as might be expected, the focus for much discovery
litigation.42 E-mail programs typically store a copy of every message
that is received and sent by the user. Thus, multiple copies of an e-
mail message are often stored on the computer of both the sender
and receiver—even if they are deleted by both. E-mail messages also
embed within them information about the time they were generated,
received and read, as well as the identity of the author and recipient.
It is fairly easy for knowledgeable computer users to create e-mail
messages that falsify this information, an activity that is sometimes re-
ferred to as "spoofing." As one commentator has explained, senders
of bulk commercial e-mail use spoofing to disguise their identity. The
sender need only use a false identity and invalid credit card number
to activate an Internet account that enables her to send e-mail under
a false name; the account is opened before the information is verified,
allowing the sender to send numerous e-mail messages before aban-
doning the account.43 "Spoofing" is in part enabled by retail Web sites
that now allow their users to send e-mail anonymously ("anonymous
remailers"). Although some law makers have attempted to limit the
availability of anonymous remailers,44 they continue to exist and to
attract users who wish to take advantage of this feature of the Inter-
net.45
Another innovation experiencing rapid acceptance in both the
home and office is the World Wide Web. The World Wide Web is a
messages, as well as the general (and incorrect) belief among e-mail users that once e-
ntailed messages are deleted they are gone forever. See OVERLY, supra note 20, § 2.12, at 2-
18.
42 See Karen Donovan, E-Mails Helped Microsoft In Connecticut Victory, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 2,
1999, at Al (e-mailed messages showing plaintiff deliberately extended litigation against
Microsoft to inflict discovery costs in the hope of achieving a high settlement played cen-
tral role in jury's deliberations); see also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
42 See Rothchild, supra note 6, at 927. The author notes, it is likewise trivially easy for
the owner of a Web site to disguise her identity" Id. at 928.
44 In ACLU u Millen a district court struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a
Georgia law prohibiting all electronic communications that did not truthfully identify the
sender. See 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230, 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1997). In reaching its decision, the
court relied upon Supreme Court precedent recognizing a right to distribute pamphlets
anonymously. See id. at 1232 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Conmen, 514 U.S. 334
(1995)).
42 See David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and
Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Cat. LEGAL F. 139, 167-69 (1996) (defending useful-
ness of anonymous remailers). See generally Developments in the Law—The Law of Cyberspace,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1607-08 (1999) (describing anonymity of Internet and anony-
mous remailers).
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collection of electronic documents that are organized and located at
"Web sites" residing in computers throughout the world. 46 Each Web
site can contain information stored. in textual, graphical or audio
format and can link to any other Web site. Therefore, users can
quickly and easily move between various Web sites, viewing and col-
lecting information without regard to which particular Web sites are
actually storing the information sought. Web sites are viewed by
means of computer programs called "Web browsers," which translate
data received from a Web site into readable form on the user's or
"browser's" computer. 47
 Browsers typically store popular or freqUently-
visited Web sites on the user's hard drive in "cache files" so the next
time those sites are visited the computer can access them directly
from locally-stored memory." This saves time and reduces traffic on
the Internet. Computer users, however, are typically unaware of the
cache files stored on their computers because they are stored by the
browser without the users' express approval. History files are auto-
matically created by the Internet browser. As their name indicates,
these files record the various Web sites visited by the user, as well as
the time they were visited.49 Similarly, Web site operators typically
keep records of the site's visitors, called Web site log files.5°
"Cookies" are another type of file generated by Web sites and
stored on the computers of the users that access those Web sites.51 For
example, a weather forecasting Web site might install a "cookie" onto
a visitor's hard drive recording the visitor's zip code, so that the next
time the visitor logs onto the Web site she can automatically receive
local weather information. Cookies are a way of determining which
Web sites the user has visited in the past. As Michael Overly notes,
"The directory containing the various cookie files may be a source of
very revealing information concerning the user's activities on the
46
 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the Internet and the World Wide Web); ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Stipp. 824, 836-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (providing an
overview of the World Wide Web).
47 See Rothchild, supra note 6, at 900 (describing Web sites in greater detail).
45 See OVERLY, supra note 20, § 2.12[H), at 2-14. On larger networked systems, Inter-
net caches may be stored locally on the hard drive of a specific workstation or at the server
level.
49 See id. § 2.12[1], at 2-15.
50 See § 2.12[G], at 2-14.
51 See id. 2.12[F], at 2-13 to 2-14.
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Internet."52 Furthermore, some cookies may automatically keep a list
of each of the Web sites the user visits.
D. The Predictable Rise of Discovery Disputes Reording Electronic Evidence
The explosion of electronic evidence has not been ignored by
litigators or commentators. A host of articles (largely written by prac-
ticing attorneys), and at least one book, discuss the value of obtaining
discovery of electronic evidence, and how to go about it.° In addi-
tion, at least two scholars have written on the issue of how the Federal
Rules of Evidence apply to electronic evidence. 54 Given the central
role of discovery in most civil litigation, as well as the increasingly
common use of computers to generate, store and transmit informa-
don, it is safe to predict that federal courts will see a surge in the
number of discovery disputes arising from electronic discovery. The
next parts of this Article explain how discovery proceeds under Rule
34 and discuss why electronic discovery disputes will generate new
issues that courts may not be able to address easily under that Rule.
52 Id. § 2.12[F], at 2-14.
53 See, e.g., OVERLY, supra note 20; Feldman & Kohn, supra note 37; Ronald L. Plesser
& Emilio W. Cisidanes. Discovery And Other Problems Related 7b Electronically Stored Data And
Privacy, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND THE INTERNET 227
(1995); Zanunit & Herscha, supra note 14, at 107; Matthew J. Rester, A Wreck On The Info-
Balm: Electronic Mail And The Destruction Of Evidence, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 75 (1998);
Patrick R. Grady, Discovery Of Computer Stored Documents And Computer Based Litigation Sup-
port Systems: Why Give Up More Than Necessary, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523
(1996); Gregory S. Johnson, A Practitioner's Overview Of Digital Discovery, 33 GONZ. L. REV.
347 (1997-98); Susan E. Davis, Elementary Discovery, My Dear Watson: 7bday's Evidence Comes
In Bytes And Megabytes, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 53; Debra S. Katz & Alan R. Rabat, Electronic
Discovery In Employment Discrimination Cases, TRIAL, Dec. 1998, at 28; Joseph L. Kashi, How
To Conduct On Premises Discovery Of Computer Records, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Mar. 1998, at 255;
Peter V. Lacouture, Discovery And The Use Of Computer-Based Information In Litigation, RI. B.
J., Dec. 1996, at 9; Charles A. Lovell & Roger W. Hohnes. The Dangers Of E-Mail: The Need
For Electronic Data Retention Policies, RI. B. J., Dec. 1995, at 7; Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M.
Roil. Discovery Of E-Mail And Other Computerized Information, ARIZ. ATT'v, Apr. 1995, at 16;
Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Electronic Mail And Other Computer Information Shouldn't
Be Overlooked, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1995, at 21; Clifford Miller, Electronic Evidence—Can
You Prove The Transaction Took Placer, COMPUTER LAW., May 1992, at 21; Silvernail, supra
note 4; Whitehair & Koontz, supra note 9. at 45; Stephen Zovickian & Geoffrey Howard,
Electronic Discovery In Construction Litigation. CONSTRUCTION LA•., July 1998, at 8.
54 See James E. Carbine & Lynn McLain, Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility
of Computer-Generated Evidence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. U. 1 (1999);
Antliony .J. Dreyer, W7ren the Postman Beeps Twice: The Admissibility of Electronic Mail under the
Business Records Exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1996).
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II. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF RULE 34 DISCOVERY
A. An Overview ofFederalDiscovery Tools
Rules 26 through 37 govern discovery procedures in federal civil
actions. As a general matter, they are designed to enable litigants to
obtain all the evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute
as well as to prepare for trial. 55
 The Supreme Court describes the un-
derlying goals of these Rules in Hickman v. Taylor:
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by
Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the prior fed-
eral practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving issue-
formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily
and inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues
and the facts before trial was narrowly confined and was of-
ten cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, restrict
the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest
the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the
preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery
now serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing
under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between
the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or
information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts, rela-
tive to those issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no
longer need to be carried on in the dark. The way is now
clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before tria1.56
Such an approach reflects a significant change from the traditional
Anglo-American approach of severely limited pre-trial discovery. As
one treatise explains, the formulation of Rules 26 to 37 reflects a shift
to thinking of trials as a search for.truth rather than a battle of wits."
55 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 1 (the
Rules should be "construed and administrated to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.").
56 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947) (cited in 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 21, § 2001, at 39).
57 See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, at 40 (describing liberalization of the discovery
rules). Professors Wright, Miller and Marcus identify three distinct purposes of the current
discovery rules: "(1) To narrow the issues, in order that at the trial it may be necessary to
produce evidence only on a residue of matters that are found to be actually disputed and
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The fundamental tools of discovery in federal courts are mandatory
initial disclosure,58 oral and written depositions,59 interrogatories,60
requests for production of documents and things," requests for
physical and mental examination of persons, 62 expert disclosure,63
requests for admissions" and subpoenas to non-parties. 65
Rule 26(b) (1) defines the scope of discoverable information:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of
the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, cus-
tody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of per-
sons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The in-
formation sought need not be admissible at trial if the in-
formation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."
Rule 26 also requires the initial disclosure of "data compilations" and
"tangible things" relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity
in the pleadings. 67 While Rule 26 and the Advisory Committee Notes
("Notes") that follow it contain no language to indicate whether elec-
tronic evidence was intended to fall within these categories, the
Committee continents regarding the definition of "documents" under
Rule 34 arguably indicate that use of the term "data compilation" in
Rule 26 was intended to include electronically-stored (or "computer-
ized") data. It also could be argued, however, that the Advisory Com-
controverted. (2) To obtain evidence for use at the trial. (3) To secure information about
the existence of evidence that may be used at the trial and to ascertain how and from
whom it may be procured ... ." Id. at 41.
5a See FED. R. Cm P. 26(a) (1). An amendment of this Rule is also slated to take effect
• in December 2000. See discussion supra note 22.
59 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 30, 31.
60 See FED. R. Qv. P. 33.
64 See FED. R. CD'. P. 34 (also allowing entry upon land for inspection and other pur-
poses).
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
" See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a) (2).
64 See FED. R. Cm P. 36.
65 See FEE). R. Qv. P. 45.
66 Fan. R. Qv. P. 26(b) (1).
67 But see supra note 22 (quoting language of revised Rule 26(b) (1), to take effect at
the end of 2000).
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mittee ("Committee") knew how to make express reference to com-
puterized data when it wished to (such as in the case of its comments
regarding Rule 34) and that the lack of any such reference in Rule 26
and its comments indicates that the Committee did not wish to incor-
porate computerized data within the scope of Rule 26.
B. A Basic Description of Rule 34
In addition to the limits of discovery set by Rule 26, Rule 34 de-
scribes both the scope of documentary discovery and the procedure
by which litigants may obtain that discovery. Rule 34(a) allows any
party to serve on any other party a request
to produce and permit the party making the request, or
someone acting on the requestor's behalf, to inspect and
copy, any designated documents (including writings, draw-
ings, graphs, charts, photographs, phonorecords, and other
data compilations from which information can be obtained, trans-
lated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection de-
vices into reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy,
test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or con-
tain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in
the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom
the request is served [.] 68
The Notes to the 1970 Amendment to Rule 34 include the follow-
ing explanation:
The inclusive description of "documents" is revised to accord
with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 ap-
plies to electronic data compilations from which information
can be obtained only with the use of detection devices, and
that when that data can as a practical matter be made usable
by the discovering party only through respondent's devices,
respondent may be required to use [its] devices to translate
the data into usable form. In many instances, this means that
respondent will have to supply a print-out of computer data
.... Similarly, if the discovering party needs to check the
electronic source itself, the court may protect respondent
68 FED. R. Cm P. 34(a) (emphasis added).
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with respect to preservation of [its] records, confidentiality
of nondiscoverable matters, and costs.°
This Note implies that a respondent satisfies its Rule 34 production
obligations by providing a "print-out" of electronic evidence, thereby
minimizing the importance of the manner in which , electronic evi-
dence is produced. For reasons discussed in Parts III and IV, the dif-
ferences between producing electronic evidence in electronic format
versus hard copy are more significant than the 1970 Note suggests.
Rule 34 (b) sets forth the required procedure for documentary
discovery:
The request shall set forth, either by individual item or by
category, the items to be inspected and describe each with
reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reason-
able time, place, and manner of making the inspection and
performing the related acts. Without leave of court or writ-
ten stipulation, a request may not be served before the time
specified in Rule 26(d).
The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a
written response within 30 days after the service of the re-
quest. A shorter or longer time may be directed by the court
or, in the absence of such an order, agreed to in writing by
the parties, subject to Rule 29. The response shall state, with
respect to each item or category, that inspection and related
activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is
objected to, in which event the reasons for the objection
shall be stated. If objection is made to part of an item or
category; the part shall be specified and inspection permit-
ted of the remaining parts. The party submitting the request
may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any
objection to or other failure to respond to the request or any
part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection as re-
quested.
A party who produces documents for inspection shall
produce them as they are kept in the usual course of busi-
ness or shall organize and label them to correspond with the
categories in the request."
69 FED. R. Qv. P. 34 advisory committee's note (1070).
7° F. R. Qv. P. 34(b).
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Stated more simply, Rule 34(b) allows a party seeking to inspect the
documents or things of another party to do so by serving a request
that specifically identifies what is to be inspected, as well as where and
when.71 The respondent must serve a response within a specified pe-
riod of time, indicating that the request will be granted or setting
forth an objection to the request (for example, on the basis that the
requested material is privileged). If the parties cannot resolve the re-
spondent's objections, the requesting party must seek the presiding
court's intervention under Rule 37(a). 72
There are no special rules governing discovery of electronic in-
formation; rather, it proceeds under the same framework as discovery
of any other information under Rule 34. The responding party con-
fronts threshold issues as to whether the requested information is dis-
coverable—within.the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)—and if so, whether it is
privileged. For non-privileged, discoverable information, secondary
issues arise as to the way in which the information is produced to the
requesting party, including when, where and how the production
takes place, and who bears the costs associated with the discovery.
III. IS RULE 34 CAPABLE OF GOVERNING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY?
As discussed above, the Rules provide only limited guidance with
respect to electronic data and the extent to which it is discoverable.
The legal community must squarely address the question of whether
the current Rules are adequate to govern the discovery of electronic
evidence or whether the Rules need to be revised to account for the
differences between electronic and paper evidence." In this Part, we
focus specifically on the question of whether Rule 34 provides an ade-
quate framework for the discovery of electronic evidence.
A. New Issues Generated By Electronic Evidence
Efforts to discover electronic documents have generated a host of
new discovery issues with which courts are only beginning to grapple.
71 SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
72 See FED. R. Cm P. 37(a).
" The same question has been asked more broadly in related contexts. For example,
Professor Lawrence Lessig questioned whether cyberspace may be regulated by analogy to
the regulation of other space, or whether "the old analogies just don't cut it." See Lawrence
Lessig, The Path Of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1743 n.1 (1995) (quoting Trotter Hardy,
The Proper Legal Regimefor "Cyberspace," 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 993, 994 (1994)).
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As an initial matter, it is unclear whether the newest forms of elec-
tronic evidence described above fall within the rubric of discoverable
"documents" under Rule 34—even when taking into consideration
the Rule's express inclusion of "data compilations" within the
definition of that term. 74 For example, is a cookie or cache file cre-
ated by a Web site and automatically downloaded onto a user's com-
pliter, without her knowledge or consent, a "document" within the
scope of Rule 34(a)? What about embedded data, such as that which
is automatically created by most word processing programs to record
the date specific documents are edited? While presumably these types
of evidence are "data" in a generic sense, they are not "compilations"
in the ordinary sense of something composed out of materials taken
from other preexisting documents. 75 Rather, temporary, backup,
cookie, cache and history files all. represent examples of a sui genet-is
family of computer-created information.
Beyond this type of basic definitional quandary, Rule 34 discov-
ery of electronic evidence also presents logistical difficulties. Con-
sider, for example, two quite basic questions relating to the produc-
don of electronic documents pursuant to Rule 34:
1) If a producing party" elects to produce electronic
documents in hard copy, does this comply with Rule 34(b)'s
requirement that the documents be produced "as they are
kept in the usual course of business" or be organized and la-
beled to correspond to the categories of the request?; and
2) If a litigant requests the production of electronically-
stored information in hard copy as well as electronic format,
should it bear the cost of producing the duplicate hard cop-
ies?
These two questions may appear mundane, but we choose them to
illustrate problems that often arise when dealing with discovery: given
the growing presence of computers in the American workplace, 77 it is
fair to assume that all Rule 34 document demands propounded to
74 See FED. R. Cm P. 34(a).
75 See OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 605 (2d ed. 1989) (defining compilation as
"heaping or piling together; accumulation").
76 In accordance with common usage, we use the terms "producing party" and "re-
spondent" interchangeably to refer to a litigant that produces documents pursuant to a
Rule 34 document demand. Similarly, we use the term "requesting party" to refer to a liti-
gant that propounds discovery requests or demands.
77 See Feldman & Kohn, supra note 37, at 56 (reporting that 90% of organizations with
over 1000 employees use e-mail).
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corporate litigants will include a request for non-privileged electronic
documents.
Consider the first question. In producing electronic documents,
the respondent must choose between allowing the requesting party to
copy the documents in their electronic form (or providing such a
copy)" and allowing the requesting party to print a hard copy of the
electronic documents (or providing such hard copies). The former
method of production may be impracticable because it necessarily
allows an adversary access to the respondent's computer files and
therefore, perhaps, access to trade secrets, privileged material or pro-
prietary information about the way the responding party uses com-
puters to run its business that is not discoverable." The latter method
may be distasteful because it is expensive, time-consuming and poten-
tially disruptive." Assuming, however, that the respondent prefers one
method over the other, is it entitled to elect which method it uses to
produce responsive documents? And where producing hard copies of
electronic documents in addition to producing those documents in
electronic format consumes valuable resources and generates burden-
some expenses, may the respondent shift the cost of that discovery to
the requesting party?
Courts have addressed similar issues in the context of traditional
discovery. But hard copies of electronic documents do not display
embedded data—for example, the date and time the document was
created.81
 Also, for reasons explained further in Part III.C.2., the pro-
duction of electronic documents may infringe the proprietary or
trade secret interests of the respondent. Courts must therefore recog-
nize that the choice between producing a document in electronic
format or hard copy is not necessarily analogous to choosing between
78 Electronic storage devices typically permit users to replicate the information they
store by copying data directly onto another electronic storage device, such as a floppy disk
(which can fit in a shirt pocket without difficulty).
" For example, consider a Rule 34 request for any documents concerning the respon-
dent's financial condition in 1099. The respondent might store that information in a cus-
tomized spreadsheet program file. Producing the program file would not only reveal the
financial information sought by the document request, but also might provide the request-
ing party with portions of the customized spreadsheet software and reveal how the respon-
dent organized its program files to use financial information in the course of its business
operations. See also infra Part IILC.2. for another example of how producing information
in electronic form may infringe the proprietary rights of the respondent.
88 Document requests may implicate such massive quantities of documents that print-
ing those documents from the computer system would tie up printers for extended peri-
ods, thereby preventing others from using them and requiring extensive supervision.
" See supra Part I.C.1. (discussing embedded data).
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the production of original and duplicate versions of a paper docu-
ment. Given the technological differences between paper and elec-
tronic evidence, decisional law governing paper discovery may not
shed much light upon how electronic discovery disputes should be
resolved.
Because the volume of electronic evidence maintained by a party
can be staggering, the questions raised above are not merely logistical
details. In many cases they are of paramount importance, because the
cost of electronic discovery may become the decisive factor in devel-
oping a comprehensive litigation strategy. Consider a Rule 34 demand
asking that a corporation produce all written communications, in-
cluding e-mail, in which the research and development of a specific
product is discussed. 82 Assuming an objection to the scope and bur-
den of such a request, a court may be required to apply the seldom-
used "proportionality" limitations of Rule 26(b) (2)." Again, the phe-
nomenon of massive document productions is not unique to elec-
tronic discovery. Computers, however, enable individuals and small
businesses to store immense quantities of data—thus exposing them
to the risk of litigation costs substantially out of proportion to their
ability to bear those costs.
It is also easy to hypothesize situations in which courts will be
faced with other difficult questions that have not previously been
raised during discovery battles over paper-based evidence. For exam-
ple, must a litigant search for embedded and backup files84 to satisfy
its mandatory initial disclosure obligations? Must a respondent search
for and produce residual data—that is, documents or program files
that were deleted but which remain at least partially intact? To what
extent are computerized litigation support systems consisting of elec-
tronic documents created before litigation commenced protected by
the work-product doctrine? Should there be limits on the extent to
82 The Intel Corporation was required to respond to such a document demand pro-
pounded by the Federal Trade Commission in 1997.
83 Rule 26(b) (2) allOws courts to limit discovery in three specific circumstances: (i)
where "the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;" (ii)
where "the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to
obtain the information sought;" or (iii) where "the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely .benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery iu resolving the issues." FED. R.
Ctv. P. 26(b) (2); see infra notes 164-66 and Accompanying text (discussing proportionality
provisions).
84 See supra Part I.C.I. (explaining and defining these terms).
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which non-parties may be required to produce electronic evidence
and to bear the cost of that production?
While this Article cannot provide a thorough consideration of
each of these issues, we raise them to underscore our concern that the
nature of electronic evidence, and the logistics of its discovery, raise
issues that may not be adequately addressed by Rule 34. That said, we
turn to an examination of how courts currently address electronic
discovery issues and specifically how Rule 34 has been applied to the
two issues highlighted above—the manner in which electronic docu-
ments are produced and whether the costs of duplicate hard copy
production of electronic evidence may be shifted to the requesting
party.
B. How Courts Currently Address Electronic Discovery
Courts and commentators have generally interpreted Rule 34
and its accompanying Advisory Committee Note to allow the discov-
ery of electronic evidence. 85 As Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck con-
cluded in an oft-quoted phrase several years ago, IT] oday it is black
letter law that computerized data is discoverable if relevant." 86 And,
one leading treatise on federal civil procedure states that "Nile rule
now clearly allows discovery of information even though the informa-
tion is on computer."87 The absence of any recent decisional law or
commentary taking a contrary position illustrates that if there were
doubts as to whether Rule 34 permitted discovery of electronic
documents such as e-mail when it was amended in 1970, those doubts
85 See, e.g., Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 648 (2d Cu: 1977) (en bauc) ("The 1970
Amendments to the Federal Rules rendered Rule 34 specifically applicable to the discov-
ery of computerized information ..."), reu'd on other grounds sub nom. Oppenheimer Fund,
Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978); see also Crowii Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376,
1382-83 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding computerized data discoverable under Rule 34 even
where discovery demand seeks "written documents"); Williams v E.I. du Pont de Nemours
Be Co., 119 F.R.D. 648, 651 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (computerized database on disk and related
explanatory description within scope of Rule 34 discovery); National Union Elec. Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Stipp. 1257, 1261-62 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (ordering plaintiff
to produce computer tape in readable form); Adams V. Dall River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220,
221-22 (W.D. Va. 1972) (computer cards or tapes from master payroll file and computer
printouts for W-2 form within scope of Rule 34).
" Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995).
87 8 WRIGHT ET AL., Supra note 21, § 2218, at 450 (the 1970 amendment to Rule 34
"brought the federal rules ... into the computer age"); see also 7 JAmEs Wm. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 34.12[3][al , at 34-37 (3d ed. 1999) ("Computer records
and other electronically stored data are clearly within the permissible scope of discovery.").
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now have been universally dispelled. As stated earlier, however,
whether the Rules permit discovery of the newest forms of electronic
evidence such as cookies, temporary files and residual data remains
an open question.
A scattered body of case law dealing with electronic discovery
disputes under Rule 34 has developed throughout the federal courts
during the last fifteen years. Unfortunately, these opinions provide a
less-than-crystalline legal framework regarding the issues presented by
electronic discovery. For example, although it is widely agreed that
Rule 34 permits discovery of electronic documents such as e-mail
messages, little consensus exists on the manner in which such discov-
ery should be conducted. 88
There are several reasons why courts have failed to produce a co-
herent body of case law on these issues. First, district court opinions
• resolving discovery disputes are interlocutory in nature and thus not
subject to immediate appea1. 88 Rather, the losing party must wait until
final judgment has been entered before appealing a discovery order
and then must show prejudice from pretrial rulings on discovery mat-
ters. Because discovery orders are rarely reviewed by the appellate
courts, this body of law has been developed almost entirely by deci-
sions of district and magistrate judges that are not controlling prece-
dent even within their own distriCt—a fact that disfavors uniformity.
As one commentator recently noted:
[C]ourts are hindered not only by technological obstacles to
understanding the issues but also by the lack of any coherent
body of law organizing the handful of relevant precedents in
this largely-discretionary realm of adjudication. Thus, in re-
cent cutting edge decisions over discovery into an oppo-
nent's computer system, courts write as if on a blank slate,
88 See, e.g., infra text notes 104-11 (discussing confliCt between the holdings of, inter
alia, Hasbro, 1995 WL 649934, at '0 1 and Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 932-
33 (9th Cir. 1982) on the issue of whether respondent must produce both hard copy and
electronic version of discoverable information).
89 See, e.g., City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A discovery
order, unlike a final order, is interlocutory and non-appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.")
(citing Hartley Pen Co. v. United States District Court, 287 F.2d 324, 326-27 (9th Cir.
1961)). Indeed, the vast majority of discovery decisions are issued orally rather than by
written opinion.
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without acknowledging other decisions involving discovery
of the same or analogous types of materials 9D
Without any language in Rule 34 to guide them, courts have instead
drawn on established discovery principles to resolve the disputes aris-
ing from electronic discovery, with varying degrees of clarity, consis-
tency and persuasiveness.
1. Cases Addressing the Manner in Which Documents Are Produced
Pursuant to Rule 34
In 1980, the Advisory Committee observed that "[i] t is apparently
not rare for parties deliberately to mix critical documents with oth-
ers in the hope of obscuring significance."91
 To prevent such discovery
abuse, Rule 34 was amended to state that a party shall produce docu-
ments for inspection "as they are kept in the usual course of business
or shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories in
the request."92
 The language of the amendment is ambiguous, how-
ever, as to who is entitled to elect the manner of production. This
ambiguity raises the following question: If the requesting party de-
mands that the respondent produce documents in an organized and
labeled manner, may the respondent nevertheless produce the re-
quested documents as they are kept in the ordinary course of busi-
ness? At least one early commentator argued the responding party has
that option and could ignore a request specifying the manner of pro-
9° Mark D. Robins, Computers And The Discovery Of Evidence—A New Dimension To Civil
Procedure, 171 MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & Ism. L. 411, 412 (1999) (citing Fennel v. First
Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.34 526 (1st Cir. 1996)); see Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 669 So. 2d 1142
(Fla. Ct. App. 1996). In an effort to organize this body of law, Mr. Robins divides the deci-
sions related to electronic discovery into four categories: (1) cases resolving disputes over
computer-related materials pertaining to trial testimony, such as electronically-stored data
underlying an expert's conclusions; (2) cases resolving disputes over computer-related
materials whose discovery will facilitate trial preparation, such as the electronic version of
documents that have already been produced in hard copy, (3) cases resolving disputes
over computer-related materials that have independent significance, such as electronic
evidence relevant to a party's claim or defense; and (4) cases resolving disputes over dis-
covery into the nature of an opponent's computer-storage media, such as efforts to dis-
cover the flaws in a party's procedures for inputting and processing information. See Rob-
ins, supra, at 428.
91
 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 34(b), in Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 532 (1980).
92 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
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duction.93 The few courts that have addressed the issue, however, gen-
erally have adopted a more flexible view.
The earliest reported decision regarding Rule 34's 1980 amend-
ment is Board of Education of Evanston Township High School v. Admiral
Heating and Ventilating, Inc., in which three class actions were brought
charging various piping construction companies and individuals with
bid-rigging and price-fixing in the Chicago area from 1956 to 1977. 94
Plaintiffs requested documents relating to: (1) rewards for fictitious
or complementary bids, or (2) proof that parties refrained from bid-
ding. The issue arose as to whether defendants were required to seg-
regate the requested docUments to correspond to the terms of this
request. In its opinion, the court noted that the very purpose of the
1980 amendment—preventing respondents from deliberately burying
incriminating information among masses of irrelevant or unimpor-
tant documents—would be undermined if defendants were not re-
quired to produce their documents in a form that was usable by plain-
tiffs and ruled in plaintiffs' favor. 95
This issue was litigated more recently in T.N. Taube Corp. v. Marine
Midland Mortgage Corp., which arose from a breach of contract claim
brought by a microfilming service provider against a mortgage coin-
pany.96 In response to document requests, defendant produced 789
pages of unlabeled documents in no apparent order. Plaintiff then
followed up with an interrogatory asking defendant to identify which
documents responded to which document request, and defendant
moved for a protective order contesting the interrogatory as overly
broad, harassing and burdensome 97
Expressing doubt that defendant kept its records in the same
state in which they were produced, the court ruled that defendant's
initial document production did not meet the requirements of Rule
34:
It is certainly improbable that Marine Midland routinely
haphazardly stores documents in a cardboard box. As such,
the Court believes the purposes of discovery, and basic con-
siderations of fairness, require Defendant to organize the
93 See Michael A. Pope, Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche, Linn., Spring 1981, at
57 cited in Edward F. Sherman & Stephen 0. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery In The 80's—
Malting The Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 255 n.41 (1982).
94 See 104 F.R.D. 23, 25 (N.D. Ill, 1984).
93 See id. at 36 n.20 (citing Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 93. at 255-58).
" See 136 F.R.D. 449, 451 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
97 See id. at 451.
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documents produced on 1 October 1990 in a manner clearly
indicating which of these documents respond to Plaintiff's
specific requests for production. 98
The T.N. Taube Corp. decision is now cited as authority for the proposi-
tion that requesting parties can require respondent to label and or-
ganize documents if doing so is necessary to make the documents us-
able by the requesting party. 99
A similar approach was taken by the District Court of Puerto Rico
in Bonilla v. Trebol Motors Corp., which involved a complex RICO claim
against Trebol Motors Corporation ("Trebol") regarding its sales of
Volvo cars. 18° Trebol produced over 100 boxes of documents concern-
ing all types of car makes, models and years. The plaintiffs moved to
compel Trebol to produce the documents in an orderly fashion with
an index. 181
 In granting the motion, the court found that case law
"makes it clear that discovery must be produced in a manner to facili-
tate the mandates of Rule 1 regarding the just, speedy and efficient
resolution of disputes.' 102 The court, therefore, held that "[e]ven if
Trebol Motors is producing the documents as they are kept in the
normal course of business[,] . . . . tpilaintiffs are entitled to ask that
they be produced in an orderly fashion consistent with the goals of
the Federal Rules to determine all relevant facts quickly and
efficiently."103
As these cases demonstrate, the ambiguity of the 1980 amend-
ment to Rule 34(b) allowing the responding party initially to elect the
manner in which it produces non-privileged, responsive documents.
However, upon a showing of necessity, courts will direct the respond-
ing party to identify which documents are responsive to which re-
quests. Yet only a few courts have addressed the application of the
98 See id. at 456.
99 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 272, 277 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Ca-
pacchione v. Charlotte-Meckleuberg Sch., 182 F.R.D. 486, 490 (W.D.N.C. 1998); First Op-
tions of Chicago v. Wallenstein, No. 92-5770, 1994 WL 451160, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14,
1994); Herdlein Techs., Inc. v. Century Contractors, Inc., 147 F.R.D. 103, 105 (W.D.N.C.
1993).
It'° No. 92-1795, 1997 WL 178844, at *1 (D.P.R. March 27, 1997), partially rev'd on other
grounds, 150 F.3d 88 (1st Cu. 1998).
10I See id. at *67.
102 See id.
195 Id. at *68 (citing Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass.
1976)) (holding to allow a defendant whose business generates massive records to frus-
trate discovery by creating an inadequate filing system, and then claiming undue burden,
would defeat the purposes of the discovery rules").
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1980 amendment to Rule 34 in the context of electronic discovery. In
the case of Anti-Monopoly v. Hasbro, Inc., a party resisted a request that
it produce electronic evidence in the electronic form in which it was
stored on the ground that it had already been produced in hard
copy.'" The reasons for the dispute were apparent: in order to best
analyze the hard copy data, the requesting party would need to reen-
ter it manually into computerized form—a time-consuming and ex-
pensive process. Obtaining the data in electronic form eliminates this
step, allowing the requesting party immediately to analyze the data
with the aid of a computer.
The court concluded that "[t] he law is clear that data in comput-
erized form is discoverable even if paper 'hard copies' of the informa-
tion have already been produced, and that the producing party can
be required to design a computer program to extract the data from its
computerized business records." 1°5 The opinion cites to National Un-
ion Electric Corp. v. Matsushita Electronic Indus. Co., one of the earliest
cases to touch on this issue. 106 The Matsushita court noted the Com-
mittee's comment: "[W]hen the [computerized] data can as a practi-
cal matter be made usable by the discovering party only through re-
spondent's devices, respondent may be required to use [its] devices to
translate the data into usable form [.] " 1°7 Based on this comment, the
Matsushita court concluded that Rule 34 required a party to produce
electronic evidence in an electronic format as well as in hard co py. 108
The Hasbro court made no effort to distinguish Williams v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., in which the Ninth Circuit came to a very different re-
sult. 109 The Williams case involved a claim of employment discrimina-
tion and the court held that plaintiffs could not discover defendant's
computer tapes if defendant produced the information they con-
tained on hard copy "wage cards." Without extensive discussion, the
Ninth Circuit wrote:
All information contained on the computer tapes was in-
cluded in the wage cards which [plaintiffs] discovered.
[Plaintiffs] were therefore not deprived of any data. While
using the cards may be more. time consuming, difficult and
expensive, these reasons, of themselves, do not show that the
104 See 1995 WL 649934, at *1.
1" Id.
106 See 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
107 Id. at 1262.
1" See id.
109 See Williams, 665 F.2d at 932-33.
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trial judge abused his discretion in denying [plaintiffs] the
tapes. 11°
Since it was published, the Williams opinion has been cited with ap-
proval and followed by at least two district courts outside the Ninth
Circuitm
The Hasbro, Matsushita and Williams line of cases provide exam-
ples of how courts must analogize to paper discovery in order to re-
solve electronic discovery issues that are not specifically addressed in
Rule 34. Their failure to agree on whether respondents must produce
both hard copy and electronic versions of discoverable information
represents an example of the conflicting case law that exists with re-
spect to crucial electronic discovery issues. As discussed below, to re-
solve such conflict, Rule 34 may require some revision.
2. Case Law Addressing the Cost of Producing Documents Under
Rule 34
Ordinarily, the respondent bears the cost of gathering and re-
viewing documents while the requesting party bears the cost of copy-
ing responsive documents. 112
 Rule 34, coupled with Rule 26(c), how-
ever, allows courts to shift costs between litigants upon a showing of
"undue burden or expense." 113
 For example, one court found that
where a bank's microfilmed documents were not readable unless pho-
tocopied by special equipment, the bank was required to bear the
costs of producing the documents in that fashion."" There is also at
least one reported case that found a large Japanese manufacturing
firm was required to pay plaintiff's reasonable expenses for translating
certain of the firm's documents from Japanese to English on the the-
ory that such expenses were reasonable costs of doing business in the
United States. 115
110 Id. at 933.
lit See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. United States, No. 91-08-00568, 1992 WL 40699, at *2
(Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 21, 1992) (citing Williams and deciding that plaintiffs were not end-
tled to discover database where defendant produced hard copies); Malone v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 12539, 1992 WL 885097, at *2-3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 1992) (same).
112 See, e.g., Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Caton, 136 F.R.D. 682, 685 (D.
Kan. 1991); Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985).
113 See FED. R. Qv. P. 26(c); see also Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1977).
114 See Delozier v. First Nat'l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn.
1986).
113 See Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 69 F.R.D. 489, 490 (ND. Ga. 1975). But
see In re Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 505-09 (1st Cir. 1982) (producing
party not required to pay for English translations of documents written in another Ian-
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The distinct features of electronic documents and the novel lo-
gistical challenges of their production have required courts to address
new questions regarding the application of the "undue burden or ex-
pense" standard established in Rule 26(c). One such question arises
from the fact that, unlike paper-based information, computerized in-
formation may be encoded in such a way that special programs are
needed to extract specific information from a respondent's data files.
In such a situation, litigants often dispute who must pay for the crea-
tion and application of the special retrieval program.
This issue was addressed as early as 1980 in the case of Dunn v.
Midwestern Indemnity, which arose from discrimination claims brought
by an African-American couple against an insurance company. 116
Plaintiffs propounded discovery requests seeking information regard-
ing defendant's computer capabilities, including raw data, programs
and data management systems. 117 Defendant claimed such discovery
was unduly burdensome and expensive because responding to it
would require a "full person/year" to do the necessary research and
investigation. 118 The Dunn court held an evidentiary hearing to evalu-
ate the conflicting accounts of how great a burden responding to the
discovery would actually impose and, in doing so, stressed "that im-
practicability is not to be equated with impossibility in this context."" 9
The court then quoted the following language from Kozlowski v. Sears,
Roebuck eg Co.:
The defendant may not excuse itself from compliance with
Rule 34 by utilizing a system of record-keeping which con-
ceals rather than discloses relevant records, or makes it un-
duly difficult to identify or locate them, thus rendering the
production of documents an excessively burdensome and
costly expedition. To allow a defendant whose business gen-
erates massive records to frustrate discovery, by creating an
inadequate filing system, and then claiming undue burden,
would defeat the purposes of the discovery rules. 120
guage); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 103 F.R.D. 357, 358 (D.D.C. 1984) (same); Cook v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 92, 92 (S.D.W. Va. 1984) (same).
116 See 88 F.R.D. 191, 192-93 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
117 See id. at 193.
116 See id. at 197,
119 See id.
1" 88 F.R.D. at 198 (citing Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D. at '76).
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Unfortunately, the Dunn court never published its decision following
the evidentiary hearing.
In Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, the Supreme Court addressed
a related issue involving electronic discovery. 121 The Sanders decision
arose from a class action brought against an open-end investment
fund and its management corporation to recover damages caused by
artificially inflated share values. 122 A dispute arose as to whether plain-
tiffs or defendants would be required to bear the expense of identify-
ing class members by searching defendants' computerized records.'"
The District Court ruled that the cost of sorting lists of class members
was defendants' responsibility, 124 and the Second Circuit, sitting en
Banc, affirmed that decision.'" The Court of Appeals wrote:
Here, the demand for computerized information creates a
necessity for special programming, entailing the substantial
expenditure of $16,000 by the [defendants] . . . . If the in-
formation demanded is such as the respondent might rea-
sonably have expected to be required to make available for
public examination or for use in the judicial process, it
seems not unfair to require production of the information
albeit necessitating special programming. In this and other
respects, computer technology presents discovery problems
with which the courts have developed relatively little famili-
arity. i2o
In reversing, the Supreme Court rejected this logic. 127 The Court
wrote:
There is no indication or contention that [defendants] acted
in bad faith to conceal information from respondents. In
addition, although it may be expensive to retrieve informa-
tion stored in computers when no program yet exists for the
particular job, there is no reason to think that the same in-
formation could be extracted any less expensively if the rec-
ords were kept in less modern forms. Indeed, one might ex-
pect the reverse to be true, for otherwise computers would
121 See 437 U.S. 340,342 (1978).
122 See id. at 342-13.
123 See id. at 344-47.
124 See id. at 346.
125 See id. at 347.
126 Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636,649 (2d Cir. 1977).
127 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.. 437 U.S. at 362-63.
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not have gained such widespread use in the storing and
handling of information. Finally, the suggestion that peti-
tioners should have used "different systems" to keep their
records borders on the frivolous. Apart from the fact that no
one has suggested what "different systems" petitioners
should have used, we do not think a defendant should be
penalized for not maintaining [its] records in the form most
convenient to some potential future litigants whose identity
and perceived needs could not have been anticipated. 125
Plaintiffs were therefore required to shoulder the burden of paying
for the cost of identifying class members.
The case of Bills v. Kennecott Corp. represents another early deci-
sion dealing with the allocation of electronic discovery costs. 129 In
Bills, plaintiffs sought production of documents containing detailed
information regarding defendant's employees. 150 Defendant offered
to produce the information either in electronic form (i.e., on a com-
puter storage device) or in hard copy (i.e., the printout of the com-
puter tape). Defendant, however, conditioned its offer on the re-
quirement that plaintiffs pay the costs of generating the information,
approximately $5400.151 Plaintiffs elected to receive the requested
data in hard copy, but stated they would not pay for the cost of its
production unless ordered to do so by the court. 152 Defendant pro-
duced the hard copy and then moved the court to shift costs under
Rule 26(c).155
Observing that a producer had in the past been able to shift dis-
covery costs to a requestor by making records available for inspection,
the court noted that that option was often both undesirable and im-
practical with regard to electronic evidence. It was undesirable be-
cause of the dangers associated with allowing an opponent to range
freely within one's computer system and impractical because of the
lack of expertise needed to conduct such an inspection. 154 Thus, the
court commented that "the requested party most often has no rea-
sonable choice other than to produce the documentation in a com-
128 Id.
129 See 108 F.R.D. 459, 959 (D. Utah 1985).
Ix) See id. at 460.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 462.
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prehensible form by use of its own computer technicians"B5 and also
must "shoulder the burden of showing 'undue' expense" under Rule
26 before courts shift the costs to the requesting party. 156 Finding that
Rule 26 required such issues to be resolved on a case-by-case basis
rather than by "iron-clad formula," 137 the court denied the defen-
dant's request to shift costs for four reasons: (1) the amount of money
involved was not excessive or inordinate; (2) the relative expense or
burden would be substantially greater to the plaintiffs than it would to
the defendant; (3) the costs would be a substantial burden to plain-
tiffs; and (4) the responding party derived some benefit by producing
the data in question. 138.
The Seventh Circuit addressed a similar discovery issue in Sattar
v. Motorola.'" Plaintiff Sattar filed a motion that in effect asked the
court to require Motorola to produce 210,000 pages of e-mail in hard
copy. 14° Motorola had produced these e-mail messages in electronic
form on tapes, but Sattar lacked the software necessary to read
them."' The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order re-
quiring Motorola to provide Sattar with the electronic devices or soft-
ware necessary to read the produced material or, in the alternative, to
pay for half the cost of producing the e-mail messages in hard copy. 142
Courts appear to have been reluctant to force requesting parties
to bear the costs of gathering and producing in usable form elec-
tronic evidence responsive to a Rule 34 document request. Particu-
larly, the Bills and Sattar decisions have been followed in cases involv-
ing substantially-greater discovery costs. Indeed, parties responding to
discovery requests have been required to search through thirty-
million pages of documents, at costs as high as $70,000, in order to
retrieve and produce e-mail data."3 The guiding principle in such
cases appears to be the concern that technological advancements
should not alter the framework of civil litigation by shifting costs of
discovery. As one court explained:
133 See id.
136 See id.
157 See id. at 463.
1" See id. at 464,
139 See 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998).
149 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, 1995 WL
360526, at ** 1, 3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).
March 2000]	 Electronic Discovery and Rule 34	 361
It would be a dangerous development in the law if new tech-
niques for easing the use of information became a hin-
drance to discovery or disclosure in litigation. The use of ex-
cessive technical distinctions is inconsistent with the guiding
principle that information which is stored, used or transmit-
ted in new forms should be available through discovery with
the same openness as traditional forms .... The normal and
reasonable translation of electronic data into a form usable
by the discovering party should be the ordinary and foresee-
able burden of a respondent in the absence of a showing of
extraordinary hardship. 144
While . there are too few decisions on point to predict a trend in the
case law with any real confidence, it would appear the Bills, Brand
Name Prescription Drugs and Daewoo Electronics Co. decisions, in con-
junction with the Supreme Court's holding in Sanders, represent an
emerging majority position that places a fairly heavy burden of per-
suasion on the party seeking to shift the costs of electronic discovery.
The Dunn, Bills and Sanders decisions represent only a few exam-
ples of how cost-shifting problems raised in the context of electronic
discovery are handled under the current discovery rules. These cases,
like Hasbro, Williams and their progeny, show that while courts have
managed to resolve motions that raise Rule 34 questions in the con-
text of electronic discovery, they have generally approached these
questions in a highly fact-specific manner, producing few general
principles to aid in the resolution of similar disputes. The courts are
left to develop procedural standards regarding electronic discovery
under Rule 34 in the absence of express guidance from the Rules
themselves. To date, however, little consensus has developed as to
what these principles should be.
C. The Differences Between Paper and Electronic Evidence
Rule 34, its Note and the case law cited above suggest courts
should resolve electronic discovery disputes by drawing analogies to
traditional discovery disputes. Yet electronic evidence is intrinsically
different from paper evidence in ways that become important to the
analysis of discovery disputes. These differences may be summarized
by observing that, unlike paper evidence, electronic evidence is typi-
144 Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. 1nel Trade 1986),
cited in Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 WL 360526, at *2.
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cally encoded, processabk, invisible, emulatable, proprietary and voluminous.
Each of these terms and the concepts they summarize are discussed
below.
1. Electronic Evidence Is Always Encoded
Relatively few paper documents are encoded in the way comput-
ers code electronic data. 145
 As explained in Part I.B. above, electronic
data are stored in binary form in electronic transistors, each of which
constitutes a "bit" of information. Making those bits of data meaning-
ful requires the knowledge of how the bits are grouped into letters,
symbols, visual images or sound—in other words, knowledge of the
"code" to the particular piece of electronic evidence. The ASCII code
discussed in Part I.B. is a simple example of how even the most basic
electronic information is coded. Without knowledge of the ASCII
code, English letters stored in the form of binary numerals remain
nothing more than a series of unintelligible zeros and ones. This is
particularly true of digitalized audio, video and compressed data and
information in a database.
Thus, from a technological perspective, electronically-stored in-
formation has two components: the raw data, stored in binary format,
and the code necessary to make use of that data, which is also stored
in binary format. This method of data storage raises the question of
whether the term "document" as used in Rule 34 encompasses both
data and code, or simply the data alone. Drawing on the text of Rule
34, the data comprises the "document," while the code is the "detec-
tion device" by which that document is "translated" into "usable
form." Rule 34 currently does not recognize this distinction.
2. Electronic Evidence Often Contains Proprietary Characteristics
The difference between "documents" and "data" has practical
ramifications because, in some cases, it may not be possible to require
a litigant to provide the codes needed to use or "translate" electronic
documents. By turning over the code for reading discoverable elec-
tronic documents, a litigant may also, knowingly or not, provide at the
very least a clue (if not a complete road map) to its computer system
145
 We recognize that paper evidence can be, and sometimes is, encrypted just like
computerized data. For example, a confidential letter might be written in code, which
would require any reader to know that code before the letter could be understood. How-
ever, whereas the bulk of paper evidence used hi everyday life is not encoded, electronic
evidence is necessarily coded because of the way computers store information.
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and the way that computer system is used In some situations, provid-
ing such information may be both unacceptable to the respondent
and not authorized by Rule 34.
By. way of example, imagine a lawsuit between two pizza compa-
nies involving a garden-variety commercial dispute. A request is made
for all documents regarding the time and location of sales of deliv-
ered pizzas during 1999. The respondent, unbeknownst to its com-
petitors in the industry (including the propounding party), keeps a
fully-customized computerized data base of its customers, including
not only the information sought by the document request (the time
and location of pizza sales), but also related information about the
customer's drink and dessert of preference. This information is used
to increase customer goodwill, the efficiency of the pizza delivery sys-
tem and forms the backbone of the respondent's direct marketing
initiative. Furthermore, this information is collected by way of a Web
site that allows customers to order their delivered pizzas on-line. For
purposes of the example, let us assume the idea of using computers to
increase pizza sales in this manner is both startlingly innovative and
remarkably effective.
In this example, the data regarding the time and location of pizza
sales are discoverable. However, the respondent's "code," and indeed,
the very existence of a computerized customer information data base,
represents a valuable trade secret. If the respondent is required to
produce its discoverable electronic documents as well as the code
used to translate those documents into usable form, it will in effect be
producing its most closely protected proprietary information. 146 Al-
ternatively, it might be that the respondent pizza company's custom
data base was sold to it by a third party under a licensing agreement
that prohibits disclosure of the data base program to a third party
without additional payments to its audio!:
This example demonstrates that the requirement that a respon-
dent provide the translating mechanism under Rule 34, 147 when ap-
146 Computer programs are afforded intellectual property protection under copyright
and patent law. See, e.g, Computer Assocs. Intl v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir.
1992). Also, customer lists are clearly entitled to protection. See North Atl. Instruments,
Inc. v. Haber & Apex Signal Corp., 188 F.3d 38, 44-46 (2d Cir. 1999).
147 Rule 34(a) allows a party to serve a document request for designated documents
"translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably us-
able form." See FED. R. Cr'. P. 34(a) The Committee's Note also explains that respondents
may be required to use their own devices to translate "data compilations" if necessary to
allow the discovering party to make use of those data compilations. See FED. R. QV. P. 34(a)
advisory committee's note (1970).
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plied in the context of electronic documents, may well infringe the
proprietary characteristics of computer programming codes. As a re-
sult, Rule 34 document requests may require production of electroni-
cally-stored information beyond the proper scope of discovery, requir-
ing respondents to seek the protection of Rule 26(c).
3. Electronic Evidence Is Always Processable
Rule 34 does not contemplate another important distinction be-
tween paper evidence and electronic evidence. The latter is, by na-
ture, computer processable and this characteristic has vital practical
ramifications. For example, consider a set of 100,000 pages of paper
documents and the same set of documents stored in electronic for-
mat. The paper documents will take up at least fifty boxes worth of
storage space and require significant time and money to move from
place to place. Duplicating that many documents would cost thou-
sands of dollars. More to the point, it would be extremely difficult to
search through so many documents for specific information. Assum-
ing, for example, the average associate or paralegal can carefully re-
view 100 pages an hour (surely an optimistic estimate), it would take
1000 hours of billable time to review this set of documents. By com-
parison, the average office computer could search all of the docu-
ments for specific words or combination of words in minutes, perhaps
less."8
Despite the practical distinctions between electronic and paper
evidence, the Notes following Rule 34 imply that a hard copy printout
of electronic evidence is the working equivalent of the evidence it-
self. 149
 The unfortunate result is that courts, such as the Ninth Circuit
in the Williams decision, may view a litigant's attempt to obtain the
electronic version of information it already possesses in hard copy as
overreaching.
148
 The comparative value of electronically-stored information, as compared with in-
formation stored on paper, was discussed by the D.C. Circuit in Public Citizen u Carlin. See
184 F.3d 900, 908-10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding regulations issued by United States Ar-
chivist permitting disposal of electronic records created by federal agencies if hard copy
versions existed).
149 'The inclusive description of 'documents' ... makes clear that Rule 34 applies to
electronic data compilations from which information can be obtained only with the use of
detection devices, and that when the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the
discovering party only through respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use
(its] devices to translate the data into usable form. In many instances, this means that respon-
dent will have to supply a print-out of computer data." FED. R. Cm P. 34. advisory committee's
note (1970) (emphasis added).
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4. Electronic Evidence Is Often Invisible
For reasons discussed in Part I.C., a large amount of electronic
information remains unknown and unseen by computer users be-
cause it is created by the computers themselves. Examples of such
computer-created information include backup and temporary files, as
well as embedded information. 150 AlternatiVely, electronic informa-
tion might be unknown to users because it exists in residual form af-
ter being deleted by the user. Such information cannot typically be
viewed or even located by the average computer user (indeed, the av-
erage computer user does not know such data exists at. all) but it is
recoverable and usable nonetheless.
The existence of a growing universe of "invisible" evidence raises
the question of whether litigants responding to a Rule 34 request are
required to search for it. It raises new definitional questions as well.
For example, are embedded data or backup data "documents" or
simply addenda and duplicates? Does a deleted document that con-
tinues to exist in residual form constitute a "document" for purposes
of Rule 34?
Residual data raises another definitional question. Rule 34 re-
quires respondents to produce responsive, discoverable documents in
the manner in which they are "kept in the usual course of business"
or labeled to indicate the document request to which they respond.
Because residual data is information that was discarded by its crea-
tor—but nevertheless remains in a computer's storage device—how
can it be produced as it is "kept in the ordinary course of business?"
Respondents are presumably not required to produce the shredded
remains of what once were documents falling within the scope of a
proper document demand; by analogy, they might not be required to
produce residual data in electronic format. Also, may a respondent be
said to be in the "possession, custody or control" of the residual data
stored on the computer?'" The resolution of that question is impor-
tant because it determines whether a respondent is obliged to search
for and produce such information under the terms of Rule 34(a).
5. Electronic Evidence Is Perfectly and Easily Emulatable
By the term "emulatable" we intend to describe two related quali-
ties of electronic information. The first quality relates to the ease and
150 See supra Part I.C.1.(describing backup, temporary and embedded computer files).
'5' See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
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speed with which electronically-stored data may be reproduced. Al-
though copy and facsimile machines have made it relatively easy to
duplicate and transmit paper-based information quickly and inexpen-
sively, computerized information may be duplicated and transmitted
many times more quickly and inexpensively. Consider the 100,000
pages of paper documents discussed above. Assuming the average
copy machine can copy one page per second at a cost of ten cents per
page, it would take just over twenty-seven hours and $10,000 to repro-
duce every page. By comparison, copying an equivalent amount of
electronically-stored information to a portable storage device such as
a floppy disk could be done in minutes for very little cost.
The second quality we mean to describe by the term "emulat-
able" relates to the usual differences—or lack thereof—between
original versions of electronic evidence and duplicate copies. Even
the best color copy machines cannot reproduce every detail of an
original; slight tears in the paper, smudges in the margin or even
highlighted portions of text will not necessarily be perfectly repro-
duced, if they are reproduced at all, on the duplicate. Consequently, it
is often easy for the average person to notice differences between
original and duplicate copies of paper documents. In contrast, be-
cause electronic evidence at its elemental level consists of nothing
more than zeros and ones in a specific pattern, there is usually no way
to distinguish between an original and a copy. For example, because a
lay person cannot distinguish between different versions of electronic
evidence, it is relatively easy for litigants (or prospective litigants) to
tamper with evidence stored in electronic format in an effort to bol-
ster their claims. Indeed, the New York City police recently arrested
Christian Curry, a junior financial analyst at Morgan Stanley, for at-
tempting to do just that. 152
 Mr. Curry allegedly paid an undercover
police officer to plant false homophobic and racist e-mail messages in
Morgan Stanley's computer system to bolster Mr. Curry's wrongful
termination lawsuit against the company. 1"
6. Electronic Evidence Exists in Voluminous Quantities
Computer technology has produced a society in which informa-
tion is constantly demanded, created, transmitted and digested in
quantities that would have been unthinkable twenty-five years ago.
Certainly there is no question that the storage capacity of desk-top
152 See Howard W. Goldstein, Corporate Crime, N.Y. Lj., July 29, 1999, at 5.
163 See id.
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computers has rapidly increased over the last decade and continues to
do so. Today's floppy disks, which are the slowest and smallest elec-
tronic storage devices, can store between 700 kilobytes and 2.88
megabytes of information. Hard drives that store 3000 to 4000 mega-
bytes (or three to four "gigabytes") are commonplace. 154 This means
that the average desk-top computer can store millions of pages of text.
The use of computers in everyday life and the concomitant in-
crease in computer data storage capacity has exponentially inflated
the universe of discoverable information. In today's world, the man-
datory disclosure rules or routine discovery requests in the simplest
federal lawsuit can easily implicate thousands of pages of electronic
documents. As noted earlier, the phenomenon of massive document
productions are not new. Computer technology, however, all but en-
sures that such discovery burdens will become more commonplace as
even the smallest lawsuits may begin to generate immense quantities
of discoverable documents.
D. Rule 34 Fails to Utilize Computer Technology to Prevent a Rise in
Discovery Costs
Rule 34 discovery costs, measured in both time and money, will
continue to rise as the universe of discoverable documents expands.
Any evaluation of the application of Rule 34 to electronic records
must take this fact into consideration. The architects of the Anglo-
American civil justice system have long addressed complaints regard-
ing the speed with which litigation progresses. 155 In more recent years,
the cost of litigation has become a central concern. 156 Yet despite pro-
cedural reforms, the costs of litigation continue to rise.'" Computer
technology and the increase in electronically-stored information pre-
154 WHITE, supra note 27, at 83. Data storage capabilities are rapidly increasing; some
of today's personal computers can store as much as fifty gigbytes of information.
155 'To no one will We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or justice." MAGNA
CARTA (1215); see also Judge Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy Of Effective Judicial Supervi-
sion Over Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 207, 215-16 (1961) (stating in reference to the Magna Carta
that "almost 750 years later, that great and simple pledge has not yet been completely
fulfilled .' and noting the late Chief Justice Earl Warren had appealed to each judge "to
bring the full prestige of his judicial office to bear 'at every stage of litigation in order to
ensure promptness and efficiency.").
156 See FED. R. Cw. P. 1 (Rules should be interpreted to ensure the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.").
157 See, e.g., Boston & Maine Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 865 (1st Cir.
1993) (noting rising cost of litigation); Mitchell A. Oipett, The Litigation Cost Crisis: Is There
A Professional In The Houser, BRIEF, Fall 1998, at 33 (same).
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sent an unprecedented opportunity to harness technology so as to
prevent a rise in the delays and costs of discovery under Rule 34.
A simple example illustrates the point. Computers allow litigants
to locate, copy and transmit discoverable electronic information thou-
sands of times more efficiently than traditional document review
methods. For example, consider a document request propounded to
a large corporation asking for all 'communications between members
of a specific division of the company and a third party. If the respond-
ing party kept electronic versions of correspondence (all transmitted
by e-mail or documents generated by computer) it could conduct a
computerized search through thousands of communications for
documents matching that description in minutes. Assuming there
were no need to review the documents for privileged material—an
assumption addressed,below—responsive communications could then
be duplicated at almost no cost and transmitted instantly to the re-
questing party. As a natural by-product of this discovery process, both
parties would have created a computerized database of potentially-
relevant evidence, that eventually could be used to marshal evidence
in preparation for motion practice or trial.
If the same document request were directed to paper documents,
the responding party would be required to use its attorneys or parale-
gal staff to search for, identify, gather and review thousands, if not mil-
lions, of responsive documents. These documents would then be du-
plicated and shipped at the requesting party's expense. As a result,
both parties would incur significant discovery costs. 158
This idealized picture of electronic discovery remains unrealistic
under the current discovery rules. The prevailing rules of privilege
require a responding party to review each of its documents before
production in order to preserve the right to assert an objection based
on a privilege. The inadvertent production of privileged material may
in some cases waive the privilege forever159—not only for that material
but also for the subject matter addressed in that material. Thus, even
if computers can locate responsive materials, respondents must then
I" Assuming the responding party reviewed 10,000 pages of documents at a cost of
$100 per hour (a low estimate), and assuming the review of.100 pages per hour, the total
fees for the document review would be $10,000. The requesting party would incur copying
charges in the neighborhood of $1000 (assuming a cost of ten cents per page) as well as
shipping costs simply to get the requested documents to its attorneys and then would incur
additional fees for its own attorneys' review of documents.
159 See, e.g.. S.E.C. v. Cassano, 189 F.R.D. 83, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Aramony v. United Way
of America, 969 F. Stipp. 226, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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manually review those responsive documents to determine if they are
privileged. 160
The current Rules pose at least two additional obstacles to speedy
and inexpensive production of electronic documents. Under Rule
34(b), a responding party need not produce requested documents for
thirty days even if it is able to locate those documents within min-
utes. 161 Furthermore, as we have discussed above, a respondent may
elect to produce only the hard copy of responsive documents, thereby
potentially forcing the requesting party both to incur the cost of du-
plicating those documents (unless the requesting party prevails on a
cost-shifting motion) and to forego the benefit of being able to con-
duct computerized searches without manually entering the hard copy
documents into electronic form.
E. Rule 34 Does Not Address Cost Issues
Cost-shifting is now the exception to the general rule that liti-
gants bear the cost of preparing their own case. The Rules now allow
litigants to shift the cost of responding to discovery only upon a show-
ing of "oppression" or "undue burden or expense."162 Yet neither Rule
26(c) nor Rule 34 defines those terms and the Notes shed no further
light on their precise meaning. 163 Judges are left to determine cost-
shifting motions on a fact-intensive basis by drawing on the often-
ignored "proportionality" provisions of Rule 26 (b) (2). 164 However, as
160 We are unaware of any computerized search programs capable of determining
whether a document contains privileged communications. Computers, however, could
easily assist reviewers in the process. For example, computers could be used to identify
whether the author or recipient of any given communication was an attorney employed by
the client at the time the communication was made. Computers also could be used to
quickly flag documents containing key words likely to indicate a document that contained
an attorney-client privileged communication.
161 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
162 Rule 26(c) allows the shifting of discovery costs to protect a party or person front
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]" FED. R. CPI. P.
26(c). See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Stipp. 2d 1050, 1053-54 (S.D. Cal.
1999); In re First Am. Corp., 184 F.R.D. 234, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
165 See FED. R. Cm P. 26(C), 34(a) and advisory committee's note (1970).
161 These provisions state: *The.frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods
otherwise permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the court
if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the
action to obtain the information sought: or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
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at least one prominent scholar has noted, the proportionality provi-
sions "were something of a dud" because judges rarely have the fa-
miliarity with any given case to apply them accurately.'"
An implicit financial calculation underlies this approach to cost-
shifting. Where discovery costs are relatively low, the comparative ex-
pense of litigating a cost-shifting motion is difficult to justify. Thus,
while the Rules require judicial intervention to resolve disputes over
discovery that is perceived to be unduly burdensome or expensive,
the real-world economics of litigation limits the need for such inter-
vention to cases where discovery costs greatly exceed the expense of
litigating a motion to shift costs. Until recently, such cases were rela-
tively rare.
An increase in the discovery of electronic evidence, however, may
lead to a rise in the costs of discovery for several reasons. First, there is
the sheer increase in the amount of discoverable information. In a
world where even the most rudimentary computerized devices have
massive storage capacity, it seems inevitable that a typical Rule 34
document request (or even mandatory initial disclosures) will require
litigants and their attorneys to review thousands, if not millions, of
pages of electronically-stored information. Thus, where yesterday's
document production involved a box of paper, today's may involve a
roomful.'"
Second, because computerized information tends to exist in du-
plicate form in various locations, 167
 litigants may legitimately cast their
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues." FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b) (2).
10 See Richard L Marcus, Retooling American Discovery For The Twenty-First Century: To-
ward A New World Order?7 Tut- J. 'met, & Comp. L. 153, 162-63 (1999). Professor. Marcus
recognizes, however, that the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b) (2) have made it
"'clearer than it was before that [judges) should take responsibility for the amount of dis-
covery in the cases they manage.'" Id. at 163 (quoting 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21,
§ 2008.1, at 121); see also Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV.
747, 773-74 (1998) (discussing the failure of the proportionality provisions of Rule 26 to
change significantly federal discovery).
166.3ce, e.g., In Re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, 1995
WL. 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (litigant required to search 30 million pages of
documents at a cost of $70,000 to retrieve and produce e-mail data).
167 See supra Part I.C.1. (describing backup and temporary files, as well as residual
data). Duplicate versions of information exist for another reason as well. Most e-mail pro-
grams allow users to automatically reply to an e-mail communication in a manner that
sends both the reply and the original message. Similarly, the text of e-mail communica-
tions can be forwarded to multiple individuals along with additional comments. The result
is commonly referred to as "e-mail chains" where a critical communication may be passed
on to many users and stored on their computer as a data file.
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discovery nets wider to search for relevant information. One expert in
the field recommends the following:
In many cases, one of the .first witnesses to be deposed
should be a member of the opposing party's information
technology (IT) department. Such a witness can provide
valuable insight into the topology and operation of the
party's computer system and network, the methods used to
insure security of data, sources of potential physical evidence
168
. . . .
The same expert ieconunends that the attorney conducting such a
deposition bring a computer expert to assist. 169 The need to employ
computer experts to assist with discovery will inevitably increase its
cost. Third, the tendency of computerized information to exist in du-
plicate form will require respondents to search multiple locations to
ensure they comply with their obligations to produce all discoverable
information. As the average cost of responding to Rule 34 document
requests rises, the calculus of discovery costs to motion costs will shift,
and it is almost certain that the incidence of cost-shifting motions will
increase as well.
IV. STREAMLINING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 34
This Part offers two practical solutions to some of the definitional
and logistical difficulties arising from electronic discovery under Rule
34. First, it proposes to amend Rule 34(a) so as to allow discovery of
all forms of electronic evidence that are within the respondent's pos-
session, custody and control. Second, this Part suggests an addition to
Rule 34(b) to assist in streamlining electronic discovery and reducing
cost-shifting disputes. After explaining these proposals in detail, this
Part also discusses why these revisions are necessary and why the same
results cannot be achieved by way of decisional law.
A. Defining the Scope of Rule 34(a) to Include All Forms of Electronic
Evidence That Are Within the Respondent's Possession, Custody or Control
The Notes following the 1970 amendments to Rule 34 explain
that the Rule was revised "to accord with changing technolog-y.',17o To
. 168 OVERLY, supra note 20, § 1.01, at 3-10.
166 See id.
170 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note (1970).
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that end, as explained above, Rule 34(a) expressly defines the term
"documents" to include not only "writings, drawings, graphs, charts,
photographs, [and] phonorecords[,]" but also "other data compila-
tions from which information can be obtained." 171 The Notes envision
that respondents may be required to print "data compilations" in
hard copy in order to translate that information into usable form. 172
Now, thirty years after these revisions to Rule 34, the Rule must
be revised once again "to accord with changing technology."'" Forms
of electronic evidence that could not have been foreSeen in 1970 and
that do not easily fall within the category of "data compilations" are
now commonplace. Embedded data, Web caches, history, temporary,
cookie and backup files—all of which are forms of electronically-
stored information automatically created by computer programs
rather than by computer users—do not obviously fall within the scope
of the term "documents." Certainly they are not "documents" in any
traditional sense. Furthermore, they arguably do not constitute "com-
pilations" of data, as that term is commonly understood. 174 They are,
in essence, a new breed of information, a breed not easily categorized
within the scope of Rule 34(a).
Excluding such computer-created electronic evidence from the
scope of Rule 34(a) would effectively shield it from the discovery pro-
cess. Yet such information represents a potentially fruitful means by
which litigants may discover important facts. Thus, for the Rules to
ignore such evidence does violence to a fundamental goal of the civil
justice system—to find the truth of disputed events.
For these reasons, Rule 34(a) (1) should permit litigants to re-
quest the production of any form of electronic evidence—whether it
was originally created by a person or a computer and whether it is a
"compilation" or newly-created information—so long as the respon-
dent has "possession, custody or control" of the requested evidence.
As shown below, only minor revisions to Rule 34(a) would be needed
to effect such a change:
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request
(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or
someone acting on the requestor's behalf, to inspect and
171 See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
"2 See FED. R. Cm P. 34(a) advisory committee's note (1970).
17S See FED, R. Cry. P. 34(a).
174 A cookie file, for example, constitutes newly-created information generated by a
Web site and stored by a computer's browser program without the involvement of the
computer user and therefore arguably is not a "compilation" at all.
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copy any designated documents or any designated data (in-
cluding writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs,
phonorecords, and electronically-stored information other
translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection
devices into reasonably-usable form), or to inspect and copy,
test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or con-
tain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b),-and-which are in
the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom
the request is served [. . . 1 175
The addition of the phrases "or any designated data" and "electroni-
cally-stored information" would eliminate the need to define "docu-
ments" to include "data compilations." The deletion of the term
"and" and addition of a comma after "Rule 26(b)" clarifies that re-
spondents are only required to produce documents, data and tangible
things which are within their "possession, custody or control." This
limitation balances the broad inclusion of "any designated data" and
protects respondents from requests for data that would require them
to search for information outside of their own computer systems or
immediate control) 76
Under the revised Rule, embedded data, history, cookie and
cache files, as well as clone, temporary and backup files would be
within the scope of Rule 34(a), so long as they were within the "pos-
session, custody or control" of the respondent)" Rule 34(a) would
also include compUter logs and access control lists, as well as data cre-
ated by employee monitoring software (again on the condition that
they were within the respondent's possession, custody or control).
175 Additions to the current Rule are set forth in bold text (including the comma fol-
lowing "... the scope of Rule 26(b)"), deletions in strike-through text.
176 As explained in Part WC., if and when residual data is within a respondent's "pos-
session, custody or control" is a complex issue that, while beyond the scope of this Article,
will have to be addressed in the future,
177 In the context of paper discovery, a reasonableness test is used to determine
whether a record is in the "possession, custody or control" of a party, and parties are not
required to produce material when doing so would be unduly burdensome. See, e.g.,
Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1426-27 (7th Cir. 1993) (party need not
produce documents simply because it could obtain that document If it tried hard
enough"); Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien MAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (document is considered to be within a party's ''control" if that party rea-
sonably can obtain the document from a non-party); Wardrip v. Hart, 934 F. Stipp. 1282,
1286 (D. Kam 1996) (defendant must produce records in possession of his accountant,
because defendant had a legal right to obtain those records).
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More significantly, the proposed Rule allows the discovery of
both "documents" and "data" but distinguishes between the two. This
revision would provide a textual basis for developing separate bodies
of case law for discovery of "documents" and "data." In turn, this
would allow courts to acknowledge the special characteristics of elec-
tronic evidence when dealing with questions such as privilege, pro-
prietary interests and protective orders, "undue burden" or posses-
sion, custody and control.
B. Amending Rule 34 to Reduce Judicial Intervention and to Harness the
Potential of Computerized Document Productions
Defining Rule 34(a) to allow discovery of all forms of electronic
evidence that are within the respondent's possession, custody or con-
trol is a step in the right direction. Such refinements to the Rule,
however, do not address the logistical issues discussed in Part III. To
do so, another revision to the Rule is necessary. We propose the fol-
lowing addendum to the final paragraph of Rule 34(b):
All electronically-stored information shall be produced in
the same form in which it is stored, presumptively subject to
a protective order under Rule 26(c) (7) barring the release
of such information to third parties other than the request-
ing party's expert witnesses. Any party represented by coun-
sel requesting the production of electronically-stored infor-
mation in printed form in addition to, or instead of, its
electronic form shall bear all costs associated with the re-
quested production.
This brief addition to the Rule would have several advantages, as dis-
cussed below.
To begin, the proposed addition to Rule 34(b) directly addresses
the existing ambiguity178
 as to the manner in which electronic evi-
dence must be produced by laying down a clear and simple rule that
practitioners should not have difficulty following and judges should
not have difficulty applying. The requirement that electronic evi-
dence be produced in electronic form accords with the persuasive
holding of the Hasbro decision, which reasoned that by requiring the
respondent to translate discoverable data into "reasonably-usable
form," Rule 34 mandates the production of electronic evidence in
178 See supra Part III.B.1. (describing conflicting case law on this issue).
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electronic form. 178 The contrary position endorsed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit's Williams decision simply fails to recognize that, as a practical
matter, the electronic version of discoverable information is often
more useful than its hard copy version because it may be processed by
computer without incurring the cost of transforming it from hard
copy to electronic format.'"
Also, by adopting the Hasbro position, the proposed addition to
Rule 34 ameliorates the somewhat outdated statement in the Note to
the 1970 amendment indicating that respondents may satisfy their
obligation to respond to Rule 34 discovery by providing a printout of
"data compilations." While this may have been so in 1970, producing
hard copy versions of electronic evidence is not the practical equiva-
lent of producing the same evidence electronically.
Additionally, requiring the production of electronic evidence in
electronic form and creating a cost incentive not to request the same
information in hard copy will also reduce the overall costs of Rule 34
discovery. As indicated earlier, massive quantities of electronic evi-
dence may be duplicated and transmitted across long distances at very
little cost. By comparison, the duplication, shipping and storage of
paper documents requires litigants to incur high costs. Considering
that one personal computer typically is capable of storing two million
pages of information, the system-wide potential cost savings resulting
from this addition to Rule 34 are significant.' 8'
The proposed addition to Rule 34 also reduces the incentive for a
requesting party to file a Rule 26(c) motion to shift the cost of pro-
ducing duplicate hard copies of electronic evidence by creating a pre-
sumption that the requesting party must bear those costs. This pre-
sumption is not a departure from the majority position—namely, that
parties presumptively bear the cost of preparing their cases. 182
It could be argued that a more efficient method of reducing cost-
shifting motions, and thus keeping judges out of the discovery proc-
ess, would be to eliminate the possibility of doing so entirely. For ex-
ample, Rule 34 could be amended to require, without exceptio, that a
179 See 94 Civ. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995).
180 See Williams v. Owens—Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 932-33 (9th Cir. 1982).
181 Requiring the production of discoverable electronic evidence in electronic form
might also lessen, to some degree, the environmental impact of litigation by reducing un-
necessary use of paper.
182 This proposal rejects the position that the burden of persuasion rests on respon-
dents seeking to shift costs under Rule 26(c). See, e.g., Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D.
459, 462 (D. Utah 1985) (stating respondent must "shoulder the burden of showing 'un-
due' expense" under Rule 26 before courts shift the costs to the requesting party ...").
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requesting party seeking the production of electronic data in hard
copy format must pay for the costs of producing a duplicate hard
copy. This amendment, would eliminate the possibility of shifting pro-
duction costs by way of a Rule 26(c) motion. Such a departure from
the existing cost-shifting rules, however, may be unwise. The Rules as
a whole are designed to allow trial courts enough fleXibility to take
into consideration the circumstances of each case. Fixing the costs
generated by Rule 34 requests on the discovering party in all cases
would be a significant step away from this design.
Indeed, not everyone has a computer and one can imagine a case
where a party does not have the capability to utilize electronic evi-
dence. For this reason, the proposed amendment excludes litigants
who represent themselves, as they typically have less access to and fa-
miliarity with computer technology. In such cases; fairness demands
that Rules 26 and 34 should permit a party to request the production
of electronic evidence in hard copy without necessarily incurring the
cost of that production.
Consider the inequity of a rule that required prisoner litigants
without access to computers and with no source of income to pay for
the cost of a Rule 34 request propounded on a governmental defen-
dant. The practical effect of such a rule would be to permit the
changing tide of information technology to preclude such litigants
from obtaining Rule 34 discovery. Leaving open the possibility of a
Rule 26 cost-shifting motion permits courts to shift costs when doing
so is necessary in the interests of justice and efficiency. For example, a
party requesting a hard copy of information already produced in elec-
tronic format could avoid the cost of that production if it satisfied the
four-prong test articulated by the Bills court. 188
 In any event, the pro-
posed Rule amendment would place the burden of shifting costs for
duplicate hard copies of electronic evidence squarely on the discover-
ing party.
Finally, the proposed addition to the Rule recognizes the inher-
ently proprietary nature of electronic documents by providing that
respondents may presumptively obtain a protective order under Rule
26(c) that bars the release of electronic evidence (produced pursuant
to Rule 34) to third parties other than the requesting party's expert
witnesses. This addition prevents the disclosure of proprietary or
confidential information that might result from producing discover-
tea See supra Part III.B.2.
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able material responsive to a Rule 34 document•request in electronic
form.
The proposed Rule provides only a presumptive protective order
for several reasons. The most obvious is to allow for a situation where
the production of electronic evidence implicates no proprietary or
confidential information, in which case the respondefit cannot claim
to be entitled to a protective order. The Rule, however, must also al-
low for situations where the requesting party or third parties (such as
law enforcement entities or the press) present an overriding interest
(be it their own or that of the public) in gaining access to the elec-
tronically-stored information produced under Rule 34. 184
C. The Rate of Technological Change Favors Prophylactic Rule Changrs
Currently there is a real question as to whether the existing Rules
do an adequate job of managing discovery, whether electronic or not.
Discovery of electronic files is not yet such a widespread and intracta-
ble problem as to raise an immediate and dire threat to the continued
viability of Rule 34. We are convinced, however, that the proliferation
of computer technology throughout the nation 185 weighs strongly in
favor of not waiting until the Rules become ineffective before begin-
ning the process of affecting their change. Every available indication
shows the nation is witnessing a period of tremendous development
in the use of computer technology that will have a widespread impact
on how we as a society create, use, communicate and store informa-
tion. As stated at the beginning of this Article, our fundamental prem-
ise is the prediction that within just a few years, many facets of life
throughout the developed world will be inextricably linked to com-
puters and the Internet. This development inevitably will result in a
surge in the centrality of electronic evidence in federal civil litigation.
The lengthy deliberative process by which the Rules are changed
ensures that no revision can take effect quickly. The contrast in the
184 See, e.g., Martindell v. IT&T Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1979) (establishing
standard to be applied to a non-party government intervenor's petition for modification of
a protective order); Crothers v. Pilgrim Mortgage Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4681, 1997 WL
570583, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1997) (discussing circumstances under which private
non-party asserting its own interests may obtain the modification of a sealing order issued
pursuant to a settlement agreement of which it had no notice); In re Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on different grounds, 821 F.2d 139,147
(2d Cir. 1987) (establishing standard applied to petitions by private parties who assert a
public interest to obtain modification of protective orders).
165 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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rate at which society is changing and the speed with which procedural
rules can conform to that change raises the specter of a system of jus-
tice rendered obsolete by lack of fdrethought. Therefore, the sugges-
tion that the Rules should not be amended until they are proven to be
problematic ignores the risk that such an approach will result only in
procedural changes that are outdated before they are printed.
D. Case Law Will Not Produce Consistent Procedural Rules Regarding
Electronic Discovery
It is certainly true that the same changes to Rule 34 proposed
above could be, in theory, accomplished through the development of
case law. For example, courts could rationally interpret the term
"document" to include all forms of electronic evidence and also could
effectively "read in" the suggested addition to Rule 34(b}. Thus, it
may be argued that it is better to allow the common law process to
adapt the Rules to changing technology.
But such an approach would necessarily involve courts in the
resolution of discovery disputes, cutting against the grain of the
Rules' general goal of promoting extrajudicial discovery practice. An-
other flaw in this laissez-faire approach is that it ignores the interlocu-
tory nature of discovery disputes. As discussed above, few trial court
decisions regarding the scope and .
 logistics of discovery wend their
way to the appellate level. As a result, allowing trial courts to address
the deficiencies of electronic discovery under Rule 34 could generate
conflicting rules within the same district, between districts of the same
circuit and, of course, between the circuits themselves. The resulting
patchwork of varying discovery "rules" across the country is unlikely
to enhance the efficiency of electronic discovery practice—or to pro-
vide the desired guidance or certainty.
V. ISSUES FOR FUTURE DEBATE AND DELIBERATION
These proposals raise a multitude of questions and new concerns
that are beyond the scope of this Article. The paragraphs that follow
flag the most pressing issues that the legal community will need to
confront in the near future.
A. Disputes Concerning Formatting and Licensing Agreements
Requiring the production of electronic evidence in the form in
which it is stored may lead to formatting and translation problems.
For example, a discoverable data file created by Party A with one
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brand of word processing software may not be accessible to Party B
that owns another brand. A possible solution would be for Party A to
allow Party B to use its word processor to examine the discoverable
data files. if this is not permitted by the licensing agreement Party A
entered when purchasing its word processor software, however, the
Rules certainly cannot require it. Party B is therefore left with a data
file that it cannot use without purchasing Party A's word processing
software (assuming it is for sale) or the burden of paying for the costs
associated with a hard copy production.
Assuming licensing issues do not prevent Party A from providing
Party B with the software necessary to make use of discoverable elec-
tronic evidence, the problems associated with the generally-
proprietary nature of software remain. Such concerns may be only
partially resolved by the proposed Rule's presumptive protective order
provision. The overarching question of how to allow electronic dis-
covery while simultaneously providing adequate protection to the in-
tellectual property of litigants and third parties, such as software ven-
dors, raises complex questions.
B. Altering the Rules of Inadvertent Production of Privileged Material to
Enhance Electronic Discovery
Another major issue is the current jurisprudence concerning the
inadvertent production of privileged material. As discussed above,
existing case law holds that a producing party may waive her right to
assert a privilege if a document is produced by mistake during discov-
ery. In some cases, such a mistake may result in a waiver as to the en-
tire subject matter of the produced communication. It would there-
fore come as no surprise if litigants choosing to produce discoverable
evidence in electronic form would still voluntarily incur high costs to
hire attorneys to carefully review each page of every responsive
document to determine whether it is privileged. 186 The attorneys' fees
for a large document review usually dwarf the costs arising from copy-
ing, shipping and storing those documents. Thus, the proposed
amendment to Rule 34(b) regarding the manner in which electronic
evidence is produced is unlikely to reduce system-wide discovery costs
where the produced documents must be reviewed for privileged
communications or work product.
186
 Even in the absence of privilege concerns, litigants may elect to have their attorneys
scrutinize all produced material to ascertain the strategic value of the production to their
adversary
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One suggestion would be to amend the Rule to allow a party
producing discoverable information in electronic format to reserve its
privilege objections until trial. This amendment would allow the re-
spondent to avoid the high cost of reviewing the produced documents
for privilege as well as the cost of copying, shipping and storing the
hard copy of the produced documents—combined, these cost savings
would be substantial. The procedure might merely delay the cost of
reviewing discovered documents until just before trial. But because
over ninety-nine percent of civil cases in federal court settle before
trial, this procedure would effectively reduce the total cost of litiga-
tion.
While attractive in theory, altering the rules regarding inadver-
tent waiver of privilegë would not be a simple project. For example,
how could one prevent a party to whom privileged communications
were inadvertently produced from using the knowledge of those
communications to seek additional discovery or from sharing that in-
formation with third parties? How could such a limitation be en-
forced? This topic surely requires close scrutiny and much delibera-
tion.
C. Defining When Residual Data Is Within "The Possession, Custody or
Control" of a Respondent
The terms "possession, custody or control" in Rule 34(a) are
difficult to apply to residual data. Because the location of the residual
data has been deleted from the computer's directory, a residual data
file cannot be identified and located without use of special computer
programs designed for such purposes. 187
 For this reason, deleting an
electronic document cannot be analogized to shredding or otherwise
destroying a paper document.
The resolution of this tricky issue is of far-ranging consequence.
First, residual data represents a possible source of valuable informa-
tion for litigants. For example, discovery of residual data might allow
a party to find and use all prior drafts of a disputed document in or-
der to show the contracting parties' intent. Second, the universe of
residual data is potentially enormous. Including such information
within the scope of Rule 34 dramatically increases the total amount of
187 See supra Part I.C.1. (discussing and explaining residual data). Portions of a deleted
file lingering ou as residual data may be overwritten with other information, because by
deleting the file's address from the storage device's directory the user signals the computer
that it may re-use the space it once allotted for the deleted file.
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available information. Third, because most litigants and their attor-
neys are unaware of the existence of residual data, they may fail to
look for it when responding to Rule 34 requests. Fourth, requiring a
respondent to search for residual data imposes a potentially
significant discovery burden because it requires technical expertise
beyond that of the average comptiter user. Finally, permitting the dis-
covery of residual data, especially that of third parties, in today's
computerized world raises important privacy issues by essentially pre-
venting the effective deletion of any thought product created and
stored electronically.
One approach would be to define the terms "possession, custody
or control" to exclude information intentionally discarded prior to
the anticipation of litigation. Like all bright line rule-making, such a
solution has the appeal of clarity. Also, Rule 26(b) (3) already protects
material "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" from dis-
covery. Courts could, therefore, apply cases construing Rule 26(b) (3)
to define the limits of when residual data can be considered to be
within the "possession, custody or control" of a respondent.
CONCLUSION
This Article's proposed revisions to Rule 34 permit courts to dis-
tinguish effectively between paper and electronic evidence, and thus
allow for the development of decisional law addressing the special
properties of the continuously-evolving information technology. The
revisions would also clarify that all forms of electronic evidence are
within the scope of Rule 34(a) and specify the method in which elec-
tronic evidence must be produced thereby reducing the need for ju-
dicial involvement. In addition, the proposed rule would create in-
centives for federal litigants to use the most efficient means possible
to locate, duplicate, transmit and store discoverable electronic evi-
dence.
The proposed modifications to Rule 34 may be less important
than the questions they implicate. But given the centrality of discovery
in modern civil litigation, the specter of immense confusion and costs
generated by a surge in electronic discovery, as well as the relation-
ship between the rules of discovery and some, if not all, areas of sub-
stantive law, 188 the time is right for the legal community to focus on
the new media and how their nationwide use requires systemic
ma See, e.g., Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, supra note 165, at 749-51 (discussing
question of whether broad discovery rules have put pressure on areas of substantive law).
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amendments to the existing Rules. If this Article serves to incite de-
bate and deliberation on how the Rules should best be brought into
the twenty-first century, we have achieved our goal.
